# NC Growth Shell

PMCs will get paid in resource concessions. This solves civil wars.

**Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 12** write[[1]](#footnote-1)

We posit that Hypothesis 1a: **The greater** the **competition among** government-hired **PMCs** operating **in a civil war-torn country** in any given year, **the greater the possibility** that **PMCs will contribute to shorter duration of war**. Hypothesis 1b: The greater the competition among rebel-hired PMCs operating in a civil war-torn country in any given year, the greater the possibility that PMCs will contribute to shorter duration of war. Like any private businesses, PMCs operate to maximize profit. Yet, the incentives to generate a continuum of payments by PMCs may create a discrepancy between what they promise to do and what they deliver to the warring party that hires them. When the opportunity presents itself, as is the case when the principal is unable to monitor the activities of the PMC, that is, in the absence of competition, a profit-seeking PMC may maximize gain by delivering a quality of service that falls short of ending the security threat and hence the life span of their contract. This, we argued, could then explain why, at times, we see the destructive impact of PMCs on conflict termination. Yet, sometimes an opportunity emerges when the companies’ motivation to make profit aligns with the wishes of the principal, that is, a decrease in long-term Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 803 Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Tumaini Uni-Ingringa University College on March 7, 2014 security threats (Francis 1999). In such a situation, the inability of the principal to monitor the activities of the PMCs no longer creates an incentive for the agent to deviate from optimal performance. This is true in cases where PMCs are paid with contracts to exploit the country’s natural resources. In such instances, PMCs still benefit from initial instability in the country, after all this gets them hired, but prolonged insecurity actually hinders the wealth they could generate from resource exploitation in a secure environment. **When** cash-strapped governments in **resource-rich countries lack** the **means to fully finance** the activities of **PMCs, they may offer concessions involving resource exploitation** in the form of digging or mining rights in diamond, oil, and copper fields. Francis (1999) alleges that when the government in Sierra Leone had no means to pay for the Executive Outcomes’ military services costing several million dollars a month, it offered the company commercial rights in the conquered territory. Similar arrangements were allegedly made between the governments of Angola and Papua New Guinea and PMCs (Brayton 2002; Ross 1999). In those instances when the government compensates PMCs with resource concessions, the end of hostilities is desirable to corporate warriors because a stable business environment for the extraction of resources is likely to generate wealth in the short and long term. The commercial opportunities for strategic resource extraction in peace far outweigh the costs of foregone revenue from fighting a war or ‘‘defining’’ new security threats. **Given that in some countries resource exploration is underdeveloped and** at first **requires additional investments** to make the facilities operational, **peacetime is** far **more conducive** than is instability **to** transforming dormant industries into **lucrative businesses. Hence, PMCs compensated with resource concessions are likely to** meet their contract obligation and **decrease the security threat** to avoid endangering their stream of revenue. In other words, the opportunity structure in a given conflict creates an incentive for such actors to terminate the war as quickly as possible because doing so is consistent with the companies’ underlying interest—the maximization of profit. Furthermore, as we argued, **competition among PMCs increases** the **importance of reputation** and constrains the extent to which these companies can undersupply services to their client. Since many PMCs are eager to exploit strategic resources, **any company that fails to provide an adequate service will be easily replaced**. For example, allegedly, it was Executive Outcomes in resource-rich Sierra Leone that secured concessions from diamond mines when other PMCs had previously failed to tilt the military balance in favor of the government (Francis 1999). **This implies that when the prevailing opportunity allows** the **companies to** make **profit from resource extraction, their goal would be to ensure peace** in the country as soon as possible rather than exacerbate tensions as might be commonly assumed. The incentive to end violence will be present regardless of competition, but it will be even greater if several companies are vying for contracts involving resource exploitation. We posit that Hypothesis 2: When PMCs receive compensation in the form of concessions to extract natural resources, they are likely to contribute to shorter duration of wars.

Civil wars kill growth and cause destruction which spills over to other countries.

**Wilson Center 1** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

It has been said that **the 21st Century will be recorded as the bloodiest** of all centuries **to date.** “**Since** 19**60, almost all civil wars have been in developing countries, whose** economic **growth** and development **are apt to be impeded by** resulting **human capital loss**es**, reduced investments, infrastructure destruction, and market**-activity **disruptions,” stated** Todd **Sandler.** These statements give incentive to assess the past and work on a plan to prevent outbreaks of conflict in the future. The focus of Professor Sandler’s discussion was on the negative spillover effects of civil war on neighboring countries. **His study uses econometrics to measure these effects** by utilizing the neoclassical growth model for the long and short-term period effects on economic growth; therefore, the results are used to make policy suggestions. Considering this evidence, we must acknowledge the countries that are caught in this vicious cycle of civil war resulting in destruction of all sorts, as well as the spatial effects to other countries. The thinking is that the **effects will spillover into the neighboring country in the form of instability, collateral damage, disruption to trade** and imports**, diversion of foreign investment, and influx of refugees** into neighboring countries. Sandler’s model includes the factors of investment, human capital, GDP, population growth, and beginning level of income. He looks at neighboring countries based on the contiguity, border lengths, and how many are within a specific mile radius.

Economic crisis causes nuclear war. **Royal 10** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances **Modelski and Thompson**’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, **find**ing **that** rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous **shocks** such as economic crises could **usher in a redistribution of** relative **power** (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing** the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as **a rising power may** seek to **challenge a declining power** (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if** the **expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for **conflict increases**, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic **decline has also been linked with** an increase in the likelihood of **terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting **governments have** increased **incentive**s **to fabricate** external military **conflict**s **to create a “rally around the flag” effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the fact the democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. De DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States and thus weak Presidential popularity are statically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

## Extra Link Card (RE Solves Civil War)

Resource extraction solves instability and conflict. **Bodea 12** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

On the other hand, however, natural **resources** do **bring in** more cash to governments and the **revenues** can be **used to strengthen weak governments. Smith** (2004) **and Morrison** (2009), for example, **show that oil exports** and, respectively, oil rents **increase** political **regime durability of** both **democracies and dictatorships** rather than promote instability (see also Ulfelder 2007, Omgba 2009). Also, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue, leaders in small-coalition systems rely on private goods, rather than public goods, to reward their key supporters. The presence of natural **resource rents**, especially in important quantities, in countries governed by small elites **can** both provide resources for funding private goods and **motivate leaders to keep** those **resources under** the **control of the state, by focusing the effort of the security apparatus**. Further, Smith (2008), shows that free resources (like oil or diamonds) allow small coalition systems to (further) reduce the provision of public goods in response to revolutionary threats, increasing the coordination costs of revolutions and reducing economic growth.3 Free resources, however, help leaders maintain rent distribution to the inner elite circle despite the contraction of the economy. More directly related to civil conflict, **Basedau and Lay** (2009) **and Fjelde** (2009) **suggest that** **abundant resources** may be **used** by the government **to buy off opposition, increase** the **support of loyal factions and would be rebels or step up** the **financing of** the **security** apparatus, all of which are argued to **reduce** the **vulnerability** of countries **to** the onset **civil war**. Specifically, Basedau and Lay (2009) find that oil wealth (when controlling for dependence on oil revenue) reduces the chances for civil war onset. Their work on a smaller sample of countries with high average dependence on oil revenues shows that, **comparatively**, the **countries rich in oil** vs. the poorer ones can **maintain peace because they engage in more large scale distribution and spend more on** the **military**.4 Fjelde (2010) finds that, **when corruption is present, oil wealth** (quantity and rents) **increases** the chances for **peace**. She interprets the findings to be a consequence of natural resources facilitating the provision of private goods to would be rebel factions or to the potential followers of entrepreneurs of political violence (see also LeBillon 2003

### PMCs Key

PMCs are key. State militaries and the UN can’t solve.

**Sibanda 9** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

A significant reason for utilizing PMCs in conflicts is the fact that **some services, such as heavy aviation, are not readily available to most militaries** in the world, let alone in Africa. **Therefore, it is** only **sensible to outsource** these **to PMCs** who can do the job efficiently and faster (Messner, 2007:61). In peace operations, **PMCs provide services** needed in military operations **in a professional and efficient manner** – services that African militaries themselves are lacking in capacity or will to provide (Messner, 2007:62). The UN, for example, relies on member countries for troops. Events such as the 1994 **Rwanda**n genocide which happened before the very eyes of UN peacekeepers, **is a grave testimony to** the severe **shortcomings of UN peacekeeping** capacities. As some countries have become disillusioned with UN intervention, scandals such as the UN Oil for Food Program, and regular allegations of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in Congo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and elsewhere only add to the apparent limitations of the UN and emphasise its inability to adequately train, control and even vet its peacekeepers (Messner, 2007:62). **PMCs** thus **can** be utilised to **make operations more capable and cost effective**, thus reducing the required size-and problems-of interventions and dependence on member states’ militaries.

## Extra Growth Impacts

#### Solvency Prereq

Solving growth is a prereq to aff solvency. **EcoVitality 99** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education has been able to counter** the overwhelming **priority placed on** economic **development in virtually all poor countries.  Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education can succeed when people lack viable economic alternatives---poor people will not let their families starve to save trees or tigers**, no matter how much they appreciate nature--**and most people in developing nations want more than minimal subsistence**.  Environmental law and education rely mainly on the impact of words, words that are often no more than idealized exhortations, but conservation-oriented words have seldom been compelling enough to produce meaningful conservation actions in the developing countries.

#### Extinction

Econ decline causes extinction. **Harris and Burrows 9** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include** the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on **the sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the **potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become** self**-radicalized,** particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran could **lead states** in the region **to** develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and **consider pursuing** their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to** an unintended **escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The **close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties in** achieving reliable indications and **warning** of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times**, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may **place** more **focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if **protectionism grows** and **there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the **fiscal stimulus focus** for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious **funding** targets **may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead** to increased tensions, rivalries, and **counterbalancing** moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is likely to be increasingly difficult** both within and between states **in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

Economic crisis risks conflict. Studies and historical precedent confirm.

**Royal 10** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

There is. however, another trend at play. **Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities**. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level reduces the ability of the State to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base required to undertake costly balancing measures such as economic costly signals. **Schweller** (2006) **builds on earlier studies** (see. e.g.. Christensen. I996; Snyder, 2000) **that link political fragmentation with decisions** not to balance against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states **to ‘underbalance’**. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, **‘unstable and fragmented regimes** that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they **will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies even when their nation’s survival is at stake** and they are needed most` (Schweller. 2006, p. l30). Papayoanou (1997) observes this tendency in British. French and American behaviour towards Germany in the l930s. **The Great Depression led states to become inward-looking**, prioritising domestic economic interests above external national security threats. The inherent weakness in the disparate political outlooks that coincided with the **economic crisis hindered their ability to balance effectively against Germany**. Indeed. in the case of Great Britain. Papayoanou indicates that even though the political elite wanted to break Britain`s strong economic ties with Germany for fear of 'sleeping with the enemy” a weak political base and relatively stronger interests in domestic economic growth bound the hands of the British government. Great Britain thus elected not to undertake economic costly signals despite the presence of a clear and growing threat. Papayoanou (I997, pp. ll4-I l5) concludes that when "˜status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely`. Underbalancing (in this case. by not sending economic costly signals) during economic crises is consistent with a growing body of literature on the influence of domestic "˜veto players` on the decision to use force. Veto players are those vested interests within an electorate or selectorate that have the authority to resist change in status quo policies. The tendency to under- balance is disproportionately strong in states with large numbers of veto players, a situation more prevalent in democracies than autocracies. Where relatively higher numbers o fveto players exist within a polity, the opportunity to change status quo economic and trade policies. for example. through costly signaling. decreases (Tsebelis. 2002; Manslieldr Milner. & Pevehousc, 2008; St. Marie. Hansen. & Tuman. 2006; Maclntyre. 200l; Walsh. 2007). ln summary. I hypothesize that the occurrence of an economic crisis increases the cost associated with ECST and thus decreases the willingness of states to send economic costly signals. Although the fact that increased costs should make the signal more effective. scholarship on underbalancing theory and veto player theory provide rationale for why economic crises may inhibit the use of economic costly signals, even in the face of at direct threat. CONCLUSION The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdepen- dence to reduce the likelihood of conflict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signaling theory. It does, however, suggest that when ECST logic is dubious as an organizing principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conflict indicate that global **interdependence is not necessarily** a **conflict- suppressing** process **and may be conflict-enhancing** at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals. even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis.

#### Pollution

Growth solves air and water pollution.

**Bailey 2k** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

Why has air quality improved so dramatically? Part of the answer lies in emissions targets set by federal, state, and local governments. But these need to be understood in the twin contexts of rising wealth and economic efficiency. As a Department of Interior analyst concluded after surveying emissions in 1999, "**Cleaner air is a direct consequence of better tech**nologies **and** the enormous and sustained **investments that only a rich nation could have sunk into developing**, installing, and operating these technologies." Today, American businesses, consumers, and government agencies spend about $40 billion annually on air pollution controls. It is now evident that **countries undergo** various **environmental transitions as they become wealthier**. Fortune's special "ecology" edition in February 1970 was far more prescient than the doomsters when it noted, "If pollution is the brother of affluence, concern about pollution is affluence's child." In 1992, a **World Bank** analysis **found that** concentrations of **particulates and sulfur dioxide peak at per capita incomes of $3,280 and $3,670**, respectively. **Once these** income **thresholds are crossed, societies start to purchase** increased environmental amenities such as **clean air and water. In the U.S., air quality has been improving rapidly** since before the first Earth Day--and before the federal Clean Air Act of 1970. In fact, ambient levels of particulates and sulfur dioxide have been declining ever since accurate records have been kept. Between 1960 and 1970, for instance, particulates declined by 25 percent; sulfur dioxide decreased by 35 percent between 1962 and 1970. More concretely, it takes 20 new cars to produce the same emissions that one car produced in the 1960s. **Similar trends can be found when it comes to water pollution**. The warning sign is gone from the Potomac and I can swim and fish in that river again. Lake Erie once again supports a $600 million fishing industry, and an upscale shopping and entertainment district now lines the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland. The EPA estimates that between 60 percent and 70 percent of lakes, rivers, and streams meet state quality goals. That's up from about 30 percent to 40 percent 30 years ago. **Since** 19**72, the U**nited **S**tates **has invested more than $540 billion in water pollution control** efforts, according to the Pacific Research Center. In 1972, only 85 million Americans were served by sewage treatment plants. Since then, some 14,000 municipal waste treatment plants have been built and 173 million Americans are served by them. **Similar** air and water quality **trends can be found in other developed countries** as well.

#### Goklany 7 (Solves Everything)

Growth solves every impact, including the environment. **Goklany 7** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. **Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled**, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute **poverty has halved** since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, **the world is more literate and better educated** than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. **More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression.** They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. **In time**, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, **they put more** of their recently acquired **wealth** and human capital **into developing** and implementing **cleaner tech**nologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that **the richest countries are also the cleanest**. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. **This** progress **is a testament to** the power of **globalization and** the **transfer of ideas and knowledge** (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, **free and open societies prosper.** Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

#### Social Contract

Growth turns the social contract.

**Arnason 99** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

We may take it as axiomatic that **the social objective is to maximize** the common good or, in more modern parlance, **overall social welfare. This** fundamental **axiom** is not arbitrary. It **has deep roots in** social philosophy and ethics. It can for instance be justified on the basis of **social contract theories** in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and, more recently, Rawls (see Gough, 1957 and Rawls, 1971). According to these theories the proper social structure is what free and rational people ignorant of their prospective position in society but knowing everything else would agree on. From behind this “veil of ignorance”, so to speak, these people, form a contract  a social contract, specifying the organization of the society in which they and their descendants will live. In a deep sense this social organization is fair and just because this is what free and rational individual with no particular special interests ("the veil of ignorance" serves to eliminate special interests) would agree on. What would be the content of this social contract? Obviously two things: • Society should be organized in such a way that the supply of desirables should be as high as possible. • The distribution of these desirables to individuals should be reasonably equitable. The first stipulation is almost self-evident. Clearly, it doesn't make any sense to reduce the net availability of desirables. The second stipulation warrants some discussion. Let us first consider risk. Obviously every individual would like to have as much for himself as possible. However, when forming the "social contract" from behind the "veil of ignorance" he doesn't know his future place in society. Therefore, depending on the individuals' risk attitudes, they may have preferences over the distribution of desirables. Thus, clearly, perfect risk aversion would call for perfectly equal distribution and vice versa. With risk neutrality, on the other hand, any distribution is as good as the other. Therefore, assuming some risk aversion by individuals, the "social contract" would certainly put a limit on the inequality of distribution. The second consideration concerning the distribution of desirables has to do with their availability. From behind the "veil of ignorance" the individuals forming the "social contract", realize of course that the availability of desirables at each point of time may depend on the distribution of these desirables. Thus, with perennial equal sharing, people's willingness to produce might perhaps be undermined. Hence, it might be a good idea to maintain a system of rewards to induce people to exert themselves for the common good. This, of course, calls for a degree of inequality  an unequal distribution of desirables. It is important to realize, however, that this inequality is earned, so to speak. It is actually a reward for a larger contribution to the common good, just like the payment for labour. Therefore, any requirement regarding the distribution of desirables would first and foremost apply to the initial allocation, which people cannot really control, and not the subsequent accumulation of wealth, which depends largely on individual industry and enterprise. Modern welfare theory, although built on a somewhat different foundation namely utility theory, produces the same result. According to standard results of this theory, more precisely the Pareto criterion (see Ng, 1980), a necessary condition for welfare maximization is that the net production of desirable things be maximized. It is important to realize that it is net production that counts here, i.e. production where the use of all inputs including labour and natural resources has been subtracted. The other necessary condition for welfare maximization is that this production be shared or distributed appropriately amongst the population. So, **in accordance with** both **social contract theory** and utility theory **a natural social objective is to**: • **maximize** the **availability of desirables,** • **effect a fair distribution of** these **desirables**. To make this objective operational we must, however, specify further what we mean by desirables. Basically, desirables are what people regard as valuable. This means that **desirables are anything that people are willing to put a price on** or, equivalently, require a compensation to depart with. Thus, in a perfect market system, where everything is traded, desirables are the same as goods or commodities. **So, in this system the social objective** of maximizing the availability of desirables **is equivalent to maximizing** the gross domestic product (**GDP**). The real world, of course, does not contain perfect market systems. All actual market systems are imperfect to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, in these economies, the GDP can not be regarded as equivalent to the aggregate availability of desirables. Faced with this practically difficulty, it may nevertheless be reasonable to regard GDP as a first approximation to the availability of desirables, at least in reasonably well functioning market economies. Similarly, the **contribution of production sectors to the common good may be measured by** the **net production of goods in these sectors**. It is sometimes asserted that there is a conflict between the most desirable distribution of goods and their maximum production. Therefore, the argument typically goes, we must relax the requirement of maximum net production in the interest of equity or fairness. This argument, while certainly not vacuous, is often given too much weight. One of the most important results in economic welfare theory, the second welfare theorem (Debreu 1959), is that any distribution of benefits that is desired is compatible with maximum production and, indeed, the market system. So, there is no fundamental conflict between the two objectives. Consequently, even in particular cases, there can be little reason to sacrifice economic efficiency for more fair distribution of the net production. The reason is not that distribution doesn't matter. The reason is that distributional considerations can, at least in principle, be taken care of by the appropriate initial allocation of endowments. Thus, we are apparently on fairly solid ground when assuming that the social purpose of the production sector is to maximize the net production of goods. It follows that we would like to organize the production activity and the surrounding social institutions so as to facilitate this. For this purpose we invent, modify, develop and scrap social institutions in our search for the most effective ones given our current technological knowledge. Obviously the same applies to every individual production activity making up the production sector as a whole and therefore also the fisheries sector. This should clearly be organized and operated so as to maximize the net-production of goods. Anything else will reduce the overall availability of goods and therefore economic opportunities to society as a whole. This raises the question of the appropriate organizational framework for the fisheries activity. To this we now turn.

##### **Rawls Version**

Growth turns the veil of ignorance. **Arnason 99** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

We may take it as axiomatic that **the social objective is to maximize** the common good or, in more modern parlance, **overall social welfare. This** fundamental **axiom** is not arbitrary. It **has deep roots** in social philosophy and ethics. It can for instance be justified on the basis of social contract theories **in the tradition of** Locke, Rousseau, Kant and, more recently, **Rawls** (see Gough, 1957 and Rawls, 1971). According to these theories the proper social structure is what free and rational people ignorant of their prospective position in society but knowing everything else would agree on. **From behind this “veil of ignorance”**, so to speak, these **people**, **form** a contract  **a social contract**, specifying the organization of the society in which they and their descendants will live. In a deep sense this social organization is fair and just because this is what free and rational individual with no particular special interests ("the veil of ignorance" serves to eliminate special interests) would agree on. **What would be the content** of this social contract**?** Obviously two things: • Society should be organized in such a way that the supply of desirables should be as high as possible. • The distribution of these desirables to individuals should be reasonably equitable. The first stipulation is almost self-evident. Clearly, it doesn't make any sense to reduce the net availability of desirables. The second stipulation warrants some discussion. Let us first consider risk. Obviously every individual would like to have as much for himself as possible. However, when forming the "social contract" from behind the "veil of ignorance" he doesn't know his future place in society. Therefore, depending on the individuals' risk attitudes, they may have preferences over the distribution of desirables. Thus, clearly, perfect risk aversion would call for perfectly equal distribution and vice versa. With risk neutrality, on the other hand, any distribution is as good as the other. Therefore, assuming some risk aversion by individuals, the "social contract" would certainly put a limit on the inequality of distribution. The second consideration concerning the distribution of desirables has to do with their availability. **From behind the "veil** of ignorance**"** the **individuals** forming the "social contract", **realize** of course that the **availability of desirables** at each point of time **may depend on** the **distribution** of these desirables. Thus, with perennial equal sharing, people's willingness to produce might perhaps be undermined. **Hence, it might be a good idea to maintain** a system of **rewards to induce people to exert themselves for the common good**. This, of course, calls for a degree of inequality  an unequal distribution of desirables. It is important to realize, however, that this inequality is earned, so to speak. It is actually a reward for a larger contribution to the common good, just like the payment for labour. Therefore, any requirement regarding the distribution of desirables would first and foremost apply to the initial allocation, which people cannot really control, and not the subsequent accumulation of wealth, which depends largely on individual industry and enterprise. Modern welfare theory, although built on a somewhat different foundation namely utility theory, produces the same result. According to standard results of this theory, more precisely the Pareto criterion (see Ng, 1980), a necessary condition for welfare maximization is that the net production of desirable things be maximized. It is important to realize that it is net production that counts here, i.e. production where the use of all inputs including labour and natural resources has been subtracted. The other necessary condition for welfare maximization is that this production be shared or distributed appropriately amongst the population. So, **in accordance with** both **social contract theory** and utility theory **a natural social objective is to**: • **maximize** the **availability of desirables,** • **effect a fair distribution of** these **desirables**. To make this objective operational we must, however, specify further what we mean by desirables. Basically, desirables are what people regard as valuable. This means that **desirables are anything that people are willing to put a price on** or, equivalently, require a compensation to depart with. Thus, in a perfect market system, where everything is traded, desirables are the same as goods or commodities. **So, in this system the social objective** of maximizing the availability of desirables **is equivalent to maximizing** the gross domestic product (**GDP**). The real world, of course, does not contain perfect market systems. All actual market systems are imperfect to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, in these economies, the GDP can not be regarded as equivalent to the aggregate availability of desirables. Faced with this practically difficulty, it may nevertheless be reasonable to regard GDP as a first approximation to the availability of desirables, at least in reasonably well functioning market economies. 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The reason is that distributional considerations can, at least in principle, be taken care of by the appropriate initial allocation of endowments. Thus, we are apparently on fairly solid ground when assuming that the social purpose of the production sector is to maximize the net production of goods. It follows that we would like to organize the production activity and the surrounding social institutions so as to facilitate this. For this purpose we invent, modify, develop and scrap social institutions in our search for the most effective ones given our current technological knowledge. Obviously the same applies to every individual production activity making up the production sector as a whole and therefore also the fisheries sector. This should clearly be organized and operated so as to maximize the net-production of goods. Anything else will reduce the overall availability of goods and therefore economic opportunities to society as a whole. This raises the question of the appropriate organizational framework for the fisheries activity. To this we now turn.

## General Civil Wars Impacts

## Disease

Civil wars increase disease spread due to refugee displacement.

**Ghoborah et al 3** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

The logic behind these hypotheses corresponds to the four major influences on public health identified above. 1) **Civil wars** raise the exposure of the civilian populations to conditions that **increase** the risk of **disease, injury, and death. Prolonged** and bloody **civil wars are likely to displace large populations**, either internally or as refugees. The Rwanda civil war generated not only 1.4 million internally displaced persons, but another 1.5 million **refugees** into neighboring Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Often these people do not return to their original homes after the war ends, but **remain in makeshift camps for years. Epidemic diseases—t**u**b**erculosis**, measles**, pneumonia, **cholera**, **typhoid**, paratyphoid, **and dysentery**--**are likely to emerge from crowding, bad water, and poor sanitation in camps**, while malnutrition and stress compromise people’s immune systems. 8 As a result, in many countries ravaged by civil wars the crude mortality rates among newly arrived refugees were five to twelve times above the normal rate (Toole 2000). Children may be especially vulnerable to infection. **Non-displaced populations at greater risk as** the **camps become vectors for transmitting disease to other regions. Prevention and treatment** programs already **weakened by** the **destruction of health care infrastructure during civil wars become overwhelmed** as new strains of infectious disease bloom. For example, efforts to eradicate Guinea worm, river blindness, and polio—successful in most countries--have been severely disrupted in states experiencing the most severe civil wars. Drug resistant strains of tuberculosis can develop and in turn weaken resistance to other diseases. **It is likely that** the spread of **AIDS in Africa has** been greatly **increased by war-induced refugee movements** (Reid 1998, Epstein 2001). Finally, violence is likely to rise in the aftermath of long and severe civil wars (Pederson 2002, Bracken and Petty 1998).

Pandemic disease is likely and causes extinction. **Keating 9** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

How it could happen: **Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed** more off more than **half of Europe**'s population in the Middle Ages. **In 1918,** a **flu** pandemic **killed** an estimated 50 million people, nearly **3 percent of the world**'s **population**, a far **greater** impact **than** the just-concluded **World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster** - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A **global outbreak of** a **disease** **such as ebola** virus -- **which has** had a **90 percent fatality** rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- **or a** mutated **drug-resistant** form of the **flu** virus on a global scale **could have a** devastating, even **civilization-ending impact.** How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and **as** the world’s population grows and **humans move into** previously **unoccupied areas, the risk of** exposure to previously **unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the** 19**70s**, including ebola and HIV. **Bio**logical **weapons** experimentation has **add**ed **a new** and just as troubling **complication.**

### Extra Disease Cards

Disease from displacement spills over across Africa.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

In contrast to death figures, internationally comparable data for displaced persons are easy to obtain. **The U**nited **N**ations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) **collects** and publishes **worldwide data**. In 2006 the UNHCR listed **about** 33 million people of concern globally. These people of concern are defined in three broad categories, about 10 million refugees, 13 million **internally displaced persons** (IDPs) and about 10 million others (asylum seekers, returned refugees/IDPs and stateless persons). Figure 1 graphs the number of persons of concern for the past 20 years. Since 2000 the number of refugees has fallen from 12.1 million to 9.9 million worldwide. However, **the total number of IDPs** and others of concern **has been rising sharply** since 2002. This number rose from 10.3 million in 2002 to 23 million in 2006. How does Africa compare to the rest of the world? Africa is only home to about 12 percent of the world’s population. However, **31 percent of the world’s refugee population originate from Africa.** Most African refugees come from the following countries: Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Burundi, Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Western Sahara and Ethiopia. Table 2 lists refugee numbers for these countries. Refugees from these countries make up about 28 percent of the world’s refugees. Where do these refugees flee to? **Most of these refugees flee across the border to neighbouring states,** i.e. **they do not leave the continent**. The main host countries are Tanzania, Chad, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia, Algeria and Congo. The refugee numbers by country of asylum are listed in Table 3. What about the other large group of ‘people of concern’, the IDPs? A staggering **42 percent of** the **global IDPs were displaced in nine African countries**: Uganda, Sudan, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, CAR, Chad, Burundi and Congo. Table 4 provides the figures for IDPs in Africa. Displacement often has terrible consequences. **IDPs are at high risk from violence, malnutrition and communicable diseases.** A survey carried out in the Republic of Congo found that morality rates between November 1999 and January 2000 was more than 5 per 10,000 and that malnutrition was the principal cause of death among the displaced. A third of all children in one camp in Brazzaville had global acute malnutrition. Médcins Sans Frontières treated more than 10,000 cases of acute malnutrition.7 To summarize, the regional cost of conflict are very high in Africa. **Although the continent is only home to** about **12 percent of the world**’s population **it has a very high share of global human misery.** About 31 percent of the world’s refugees originate from and find asylum in Africa and about 42 percent of the world’s IDPs live in African countries.

(:09)

Civil wars kill healthcare. **Ghoborah et al 3** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

2) Civil wars produce longer-term negative consequences for public health by reducing the pool of available financial resources for expenditures on the health care system. **Civil war** is an extreme form of political instability which **reduces** economic **growth. Poor econ**omic **performance cuts** the pool of **tax revenues that** governments can draw upon to **finance health care. One study concludes that civil wars** typically **have a severe short-term** (approximately 5-years) **negative impact on** economic **growth** (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). A weak economy and lower 9 profit margins also decrease the contributions the private sector can devote to employee health, and the resources individuals can draw on to compensate for reductions in state or employer contributions to health care. Civil wars also deplete the human and fixed capital resources needed for a health care system. For example, **heavy fighting** in urban areas **is likely to damage or destroy** clinics, **hospitals, and health care centers; rebuilding this infrastructure is unlikely to be completed quickly** in the post-war period. Finally, **severe civil wars may induce** a **substantial flight of highly trained medical professionals**, and this loss of human capital may not be reversed by their prompt return or replacement by newly trained health workers until long after the wars end.

(:16)

Civil wars kill public health. **Ghoborah et al 3** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

3) **Civil wars produce strong pressures to constrain** the level of **resources allocated to** the public **health care** system in the aftermath of war. Leaders in post-civil war governments face multiple and pressing competing demands for public expenditures. Long and destructive civil wars produce such fundamental needs for a) a broad range of economic reconstruction, b) to reform and rebuild army and police forces, judicial systems, and state administrative capacity, and c) military and security spending in response to continuing military threats. **Pressures to devote resources to military capabilities raise** the classic question about **tradeoffs between military spending and** non-defense needs such as **public health** (e.g. Adeola 1996, Ball 1988, DeRouen 2000, Mintz 1989). Security threats may derive from internal insurgent groups, or from a powerful military force built up by a neighboring state to fight its own civil war. (See Braveman et al. 2000 on Nicaragua and Grobar and Gnanaselvam 1993 on Sri Lanka, as well as Collier and Hoeffler 2001, Murdoch and Sandler 2002.) Despite needs for better health care, the multifaceted demands of post-civil war peace building and recovery require make resource trade-offs involving health care spending hard to avoid (Collier 1999; Stewart 1993). 4) **Civil wars reduce** the **efficient use of resources** that are **allocated to public health**, and those reductions in efficiency extend into the post-civil war period. The **destruction of** health **infrastructure that supported surveillance and control** programs **for** diseases like **t**u**b**erculosis**, malaria, yellow fever sows the seeds of** both short- and **long-term health problems**. Civil wars reduce the productivity of the entire economy, especially of facilities needed to maintain previous levels of health care. **Wartime destruction** and disruption **of** transportation **infrastructure** (roads, bridges, railroad systems; communications and electricity) **weakens** the **ability to distribute clean water, food, medicine, and relief supplies**, both to refugees and to others who stay in place. It also means, as previously noted, the destruction of hospitals and other health care facilities, and the departure of medical personnel. **Military forces often deliberately target health care facilities** so as **to weaken the opposition. Much of this takes years to restore**. Shortages and limited access severely strain health care professionals’ ability to deliver treatment and aid efficiently.

Failing health sector means PTSD can’t be treated.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

In addition to physical diseases **war leaves people traumatised. Most** of the **victims** of civil war **are civilians and they are** **subjected to or witness** war-related traumatic events such as **shootings,** killings, **rape, torture and loss of family** members. **A** random household **survey** of residents and internally displaced persons **in Freetown** in 1999 **showed** that almost every respondent was exposed to conflict. **Fifty percent of the respondents lost someone to whom they were** very **close, 41 percent** actually **witnessed their death. Torture was witnessed by 54 percent**, executions by 41 percent, amputations by 32 percent and public rape by 14 percent. The witnessing of such events can lead to serious psychological stress. The **health services in post-conflict countries are poorly functioning. Medical staff** are facing huge problems of physical diseases they **have** no or very **little resources to address p**ost**-t**raumatic **s**tress **d**isorder**.**

## Crime

Civil wars cause crime.

**Ghoborah et al 3** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

**Homicide and other crime rates rise** within countries **during international wars**, tending to peak in the first year after the war (Stein 1980, Archer and Gartner 1976). **Gerosi and King** (2002) **report** a **significant rise in homicides and suicides, transportation deaths, and** other **unintentional injuries** (both the latter are likely to include misclassed suicides) in the U.S. population immediately following the Korean and Vietnam wars. **If international war has this effect, certainly** the direct and immediate experience of **civil war will do so**. These **social and psychological changes are magnified by** the **widespread availability of small arms after many civil wars**. The victims as well as perpetrators may be disproportionately among young men.

Crime contributes to illicit money flows in developing countries which kills growth and causes poverty. **Gascoigne 13** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

WASHINGTON, DC – **Crime, corruption, and tax evasion drained** US$**946**.7 **billion from the developing world in 2011**, up more than 13.7 percent from 2010—when illicit financial outflows totaled US$832.4 billion. The findings—which peg cumulative illicit financial outflows from developing countries at US$5.9 trillion between 2002 and 2011—are part of a new study published today by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington, DC-based research and advocacy organization. The report, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011,” [ PDF | HTML ] is GFI’s 2013 annual update on the amount of money flowing out of developing economies as a result of crime, corruption and tax evasion, and it is the first of GFI’s reports to include data for the year 2011. “As the world economy sputters along in the wake of the global financial crisis, **the illicit underworld is thriving—siphoning more and more money** from developing countries **each year**,” said GFI President Raymond Baker. “Anonymous shell companies, tax haven secrecy, and trade-based money laundering techniques drained nearly a trillion dollars from the world’s poorest in 2011, **at a time when rich and poor nations** alike **are struggling to spur** economic **growth**. While global momentum has been building over the past year to curtail this problem, more must be done. This study should serve as a wake-up call to world leaders: **the time to act is now**.” Methodology Authored by GFI Chief Economist Dev **Kar and** GFI Junior Economist Brian **LeBlanc**, the study is the first by GFI to incorporate trade data on re-exports from Hong Kong and the first to integrate bilateral trade data for those countries which report it—making this report the most accurate analysis of illicit financial outflows produced by GFI to date. “We’re constantly striving to improve the accuracy of our estimates,” said Dr. Kar, the principal author of the study. “We determined that by omitting data from the use of Hong Kong as a trade intermediary, the previous methodology—which was accepted by most economists studying trade misinvoicing—had the potential to overstate illicit outflows from many Asian countries. At the same time, it became clear that by utilizing aggregated—instead of disaggregated—bilateral trade data, the previous methodology had the potential to understate illicit financial outflows from other countries. By adjusting for these two problems, we can confidently say that these are the most authoritative estimates of illicit financial outflows produced to date.” “The estimates provided by our new methodology are still likely to be extremely conservative as they do not include trade misinvoicing in services, same-invoice trade misinvoicing, hawala transactions, and dealings conducted in bulk cash,” explained Dr. Kar, who served as a Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund before joining GFI in January 2008. “This means that much of the proceeds of drug trafficking, human smuggling, and other criminal activities, which are often settled in cash, are not included in these estimates.” Findings The US$946.7 billion of illicit outflows lost in 2011 is a 13.7 percent uptick from 2010—which saw developing countries hemorrhage US$832.4 billion—and a dramatic increase from 2002, when illicit outflows totaled just US$270.3 billion. The study **estimate**s **the developing world lost** a total of US$**5**.9 **trillion over the decade spanning** 20**02 through 2011**. “It’s extremely troubling to note just how fast illicit flows are growing,” stated Dr. Kar. “Over the past decade, illicit outflows from developing countries increased by 10.2 percent each year in real terms—significantly outpacing GDP growth. This underscores the urgency with which policymakers should address illicit financial flows.” Moreover, the US$946.7 billion that flowed illicitly out of developing countries in 2011 was approximately 10 times the US$93.8 billion [XLS | 49 KB] of net official development assistance (ODA) that went into these specific 150 developing countries that year. This means that for every US$1 in economic development assistance going into a developing country, roughly US$10 of capital are lost via illicit outflows. “Illicit financial flows have major consequences for developing economies,” explained Mr. LeBlanc, the co-author of the report. “**Poor countries hemorrhaged nearly a trillion** dollars from their economies in 2011 **that could have been invested in local businesses, healthcare, education, or infrastructure. This** is nearly a **trillion** dollars that **could have been used to help pull people out of poverty and save lives**. Without concrete action, the drain on the developing world is only going to grow larger.”

Poverty causes structural violence which causes and outweighs extinction.

**Gilligan 96** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

The **14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to** the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide-or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and **even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R** . (232 million), it was clear that **even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence**, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. **This is**, in effect. **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending**~ in fact **accelerating,** thermo**nuclear war**, or genocide, **perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of** behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to **war and genocide**). The question as to which of the two forms of violence-structural or behavioral-is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

## DALYs

Civil wars kill disability-adjusted life years.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

**Wars affect peoples’** lives long after the fighting has stopped. Wars do not only kill but they also cause disability due to injury or increased disease burden. One way to measure the effects is to calculate disability adjusted life expectancy or **disability adjusted life years** (DALYs). These **data** are **compiled by the** World Health Organisation (**WHO**). These measures **take into account** both years of life lost because of **disease and injury and years of healthy life lost to long term disability. Ghoborah, Huth and Russett** (2003) **use these measures to estimate the cost of civil war and find that in** 19**99** about **8**.4 **million DALYs were lost as a direct effect** of all wars that were ongoing. In addition, a further 8 million DALYs were lost as a result of civil wars that had ended during 1991-97. Thus, the legacy effect of civil wars ending during the 1990s on DALYs was approximately as large as the effect of ongoing conflict at the end of the decade. **This legacy impact works its way through specific diseases** and conditions**, and disproportionately affects women and children.**

# NC Africa Shell

African state militaries and the West can’t solve conflict now – PMCs are key.

**Sibanda 9** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

Despite the negatives associated with PMCs, there are also positives regarding the employ of PMCs in Africa’s conflicts. With the end of independence in many African countries, security has been an exception. There was a much greater degree of security in pre-independent African countries where security was designed to primarily protect the European colonists, not the indigenous people (McGowan, 2001). Colonial police and military were instilled with a strong sense of professionalism and duty by the colonial powers. Security personnel in pre-independent Africa were paid regularly, were adequately equipped and were guaranteed a pension when they retired and in the early days of independence, they were critical to the stability of African states (Brooks, 2002:3). **With independence,** the capability of these **military forces declined** and the professionalism that characterized them disappeared. **African leaders, fearing coups, deliberately weakened their militaries by purging out the best officers** (McGowan, 2001). Subsequently, post independence militaries in many African states deteriorated quickly and corruption has abounded. **Most African militaries are little more than show pieces** for annual independence celebrations and disintegrate quickly when required to perform tasks (Brooks, 2002:3). Numerous examples[3] exist of military ineptness in Africa. For example, the performance of the Zairian army in the final months of the Mobutu regime – which was unprepared for actual combat, ran and looted unarmed civilians rather than face even the most feeble of attacks from the rag tag rebel factions walking west from Rwanda (Brooks, 2002:3). **Zambian troops participated as** a part of the UN’s UNAMSIL **peacekeepers** in Sierra Leone. However, **they did not have** even the most **basic equipment and had to be completely resupplied before they could be deployed** into the field – when the RUF rebels attacked UNAMSIL in May 2000, **the Zambians were quickly decimated**, with hundreds being captured or killed in a matter of hours (Brooks, 2002:4). **Key powers have been loath to intervene militarily** in African conflicts because of a number of reasons; the danger and complexities involved have caused pundits to argue that the underlying causes of conflict must be first addressed prior to any sort of armed intervention – no matter how horrendous the cost of delay in human terms (Richards, 2005:123). Others are against this argument and point out that in too many conflicts, the average age of the combatants is younger than the wars themselves. For these and other reasons, military intervention is rarely utilized even in the most pressing cases such as Rwanda or in cases where the need was glaringly desperate. This has also been exacerbated by the new war against terrorism which is seen as requiring more military manpower. Instead of direct military intervention, **key powers** in the West **have focused on** addressing some of the **symptoms** of African wars, **while doing little to end the wars themselves** (Brooks, 2002:5). Numerous **campaigns** have been **held against “Blood diamonds”**,“Landmines”, “child soldiers” but these **have not had much** (if anything at all) **to do with the actual conflicts, and** the **shocking lack of security for the average African** (McGowan, 2003). This apparent **lack of interest** by key powers to get involved in solving conflicts in Africa **has left PMCs as the only willing, able and competent military forces to intervene in African conflicts** (Brooks, 2002:5).

PMCs will get paid in resource concessions. This solves African civil wars.

**Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 12** write[[24]](#footnote-24)

We posit that Hypothesis 1a: **The greater** the **competition among** government-hired **PMCs** operating **in a civil war-torn country** in any given year, **the greater the possibility** that **PMCs will contribute to shorter duration of war**. Hypothesis 1b: The greater the competition among rebel-hired PMCs operating in a civil war-torn country in any given year, the greater the possibility that PMCs will contribute to shorter duration of war. Like any private businesses, PMCs operate to maximize profit. Yet, the incentives to generate a continuum of payments by PMCs may create a discrepancy between what they promise to do and what they deliver to the warring party that hires them. When the opportunity presents itself, as is the case when the principal is unable to monitor the activities of the PMC, that is, in the absence of competition, a profit-seeking PMC may maximize gain by delivering a quality of service that falls short of ending the security threat and hence the life span of their contract. This, we argued, could then explain why, at times, we see the destructive impact of PMCs on conflict termination. Yet, sometimes an opportunity emerges when the companies’ motivation to make profit aligns with the wishes of the principal, that is, a decrease in long-term Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 803 Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Tumaini Uni-Ingringa University College on March 7, 2014 security threats (Francis 1999). In such a situation, the inability of the principal to monitor the activities of the PMCs no longer creates an incentive for the agent to deviate from optimal performance. This is true in cases where PMCs are paid with contracts to exploit the country’s natural resources. In such instances, PMCs still benefit from initial instability in the country, after all this gets them hired, but prolonged insecurity actually hinders the wealth they could generate from resource exploitation in a secure environment. **When** cash-strapped governments in **resource-rich countries lack** the **means to fully finance** the activities of **PMCs, they may offer concessions involving resource exploitation** in the form of digging or mining rights in diamond, oil, and copper fields. Francis (1999) alleges that when the government in Sierra Leone had no means to pay for the Executive Outcomes’ military services costing several million dollars a month, it offered the company commercial rights in the conquered territory. Similar arrangements were allegedly made between the governments of Angola and Papua New Guinea and PMCs (Brayton 2002; Ross 1999). In those instances when the government compensates PMCs with resource concessions, the end of hostilities is desirable to corporate warriors because a stable business environment for the extraction of resources is likely to generate wealth in the short and long term. The commercial opportunities for strategic resource extraction in peace far outweigh the costs of foregone revenue from fighting a war or ‘‘defining’’ new security threats. **Given that in some countries resource exploration is underdeveloped and** at first **requires additional investments** to make the facilities operational, **peacetime is** far **more conducive** than is instability **to** transforming dormant industries into **lucrative businesses. Hence, PMCs compensated with resource concessions are likely to** meet their contract obligation and **decrease the security threat** to avoid endangering their stream of revenue. In other words, the opportunity structure in a given conflict creates an incentive for such actors to terminate the war as quickly as possible because doing so is consistent with the companies’ underlying interest—the maximization of profit. Furthermore, as we argued, **competition among PMCs increases** the **importance of reputation** and constrains the extent to which these companies can undersupply services to their client. Since many PMCs are eager to exploit strategic resources, **any company that fails to provide an adequate service will be easily replaced**. For example, allegedly, it was Executive Outcomes in resource-rich Sierra Leone that secured concessions from diamond mines when other PMCs had previously failed to tilt the military balance in favor of the government (Francis 1999). **This implies that when the prevailing opportunity allows** the **companies to** make **profit from resource extraction, their goal would be to ensure peace** in the country as soon as possible rather than exacerbate tensions as might be commonly assumed. The incentive to end violence will be present regardless of competition, but it will be even greater if several companies are vying for contracts involving resource exploitation. We posit that Hypothesis 2: When PMCs receive compensation in the form of concessions to extract natural resources, they are likely to contribute to shorter duration of wars. Research Design To test our arguments, we analyze the PMCs’ presence in Africa’s civil wars in the post–cold war years. Our focus is on the post–cold war environment because private military companies that emerged during this time differ substantially from companies that have operated in Africa before. Present-day companies are well organized, more concerned about their reputation than ever, and offer diversified services (Musah and Fayemi 2000). Pre-1990 PMCs were often ad hoc groupings of former soldiers (O’Brien 2000) while now these companies are corporate ventures with permanent locations and clearly specified institutional regulations. We do not focus on freelance mercenaries or individuals obtaining contracts directly from their clients because such soldiers are not subject to institutional rules in the way that specialists working under the banner of a PMC are. Thus, the behavior of freelance mercenaries in wars could differ substantially from the behavior of PMCs. Our contribution is to address the impact of these institutionalized military firms because their presence on the continent is increasing at a high rate yet we lack systematic analysis of their performance. The study focuses on **Africa** for two reasons. First, the region **attracts the greatest number of PMCs because many states in Africa are weak and prone to** power **contestation among rival factions that often lead to armed conflicts**. This **instability is driving** the **need for military services**. Second, **international responses** to these conflicts **are meek, leaving desperate governments to rely on private warriors** to maintain security. Not surprisingly, in the absence of regional and international arrangements to prevent conflict escalation, the presence of PMCs has proliferated (Olonisakin 2000), making Africa of primary interest to study the firms’ impact on civil wars. Findings from Africa can be generalized to other cases where governments or rebels of weak states embroiled in conflict have hired PMCs. Given that in many instances PMCs operate in conflicts occurring in weak states, we expect that the sample of PMCs we analyze here is representative of the broader population of cases of PMC interventions in armed conflicts.

South Sudan civil war increases terrorism.

**All Africa 13** writes[[25]](#footnote-25)

Washington, DC — The **expanding fighting in** the Republic of **South Sudan** has killed more than 500 people in recent days and injured four U.S. military personnel who were evacuating Americans and other foreigners from the country. The conflict endangers not only citizens of that country but **threatens** to negatively impact the country’s neighbors and **the international community**, said Congressman Chris Smith (N.J.-04), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. “Already more than 500 people are reported dead,” said Smith. “More could be killed or injured, and not only in South Sudan—**the conflict may spread, threatening people in neighboring countries**. The escalating **fighting** in South Sudan **could likely lead to more terrorist activities** in an already-volatile region. The Administration’s call for a Christmas season cease-fire must be augmented by intense diplomacy with both sides.” **South Sudan**, the world’s newest nation, **borders countries** already **troubled with terror**ist activity **by the** Lord’s Resistance Army (**LRA**) **and** various **Islamic radical** and other militia **groups** in the Central African Republic, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Analysts fear that **a South Sudan** distracted and **divided by civil war would provide** an **easier operating ground** for terrorist groups. The LRA terrorist group, notorious for kidnapping children and forcing them to serve as child soldiers, still operates in the region and poses a danger to the lives of civilians in all four countries. Meanwhile, Islamic radicals have infiltrated countries in the region, most notably Somalia, but also Ethiopia and even Uganda. An unstable South Sudan will only further empower them by providing the kind of chaos in which the radicals thrive. The entire Sahel region of north-central Africa has been targeted, with Mali having been torn apart by their violent activities and nations such as Niger, Chad and Central African Republic continuing to be adversely affected by their militant and terroristic actions.

Terrorism is the most likely existential threat. **Rhodes 9** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005.

This group of **85 experts judged that** the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real and increasing over time**. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. **There was strong**, though not universal, **agreement that** a **nuclear attack is more likely** to be carried out **by a terrorist organization than by a government.** The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations will face an existential threat** from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike** on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely **initiat[ing]**e **a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

## Weighing

### General

Outweighs on magnitude.

Africa wars are longer and deadlier than other wars.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

This section provided an overview of the public health burden of war in Africa. **Africa’s wars last longer and are deadlier** than in other regions. **Recent surveys suggest that the war in the DRC has claimed** a total of **3.9 million lives, making it the world’s deadliest war since World War II.** While young men make up the highest share of fatalities in combat, the increased disease burden disproportionately affects women and children. **Wars continue to kill long after the fighting stops.** Health sectors in post-conflict economies are devastated and unable to meet the huge demand for health services. **Typically there are no resources to deal with the trauma of war. Civil wars also have health consequences for** the **neighbouring countries.** Regional disease control programmes are interrupted and preventable communicable diseases continue to kill in Africa. Temporary cease fires for vaccinations and other disease control measures have been successful to lessen the regional consequences of war. **Wars also cause displacement on a massive scale.** In 2006 about 31 percent of refugees worldwide originated from African countries and 42 percent of all IDPs were displaced in African countries.

### Disease

Disease causes most deaths in Africa. African wars prevent the solving of disease.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

One obvious recommendation is that we require more and higher quality data than currently available. Civil wars kill and maim but currently we do not know how many people die as a consequence of war. Although one obvious consequence of civil war is a health burden to affected countries it receives relatively little attention in the public health debate. This may be because only 0.3 percent of all global deaths are due to direct violence in conflict and we do not currently know by how much mortality is raised due to increased prevalence of communicable diseases in the long term. However, preventable communicable diseases are not the main cause of death worldwide. As Figure 5 shows, only one third of all global deaths are due to communicable diseases. This is different **for Africa, the overwhelming cause of death is** due to **communicable diseases, about 72 percent of deaths** are caused by communicable diseases. Wars also kill proportionally more people, 0.8 percent are killed by violence during wars. These figures may explain why war has received relatively little attention by public health experts. It kills relatively few people and the indirect effects of war on communicable diseases, the main killer in Africa, is hard to estimate. We do, however, know that the **eradication of communicable diseases** such as polio and dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease) **is impossible as long as wars prevent access to regions in which** these **diseases are still prevalent.**

## Africa Civil Wars Impacts

### Extra South Sudan Cards

Conflict goes regional – every country has key interests at stake in South Sudan.

**Kigambo 2-28** writes[[29]](#footnote-29)

The deadly **conflict in South Sudan**, itself the culmination of a long-running power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, **is** increasingly **drawing in neighboring countries** driven by disparate security and economic interests, further complicating the crisis and efforts to reach a resolution. The U.N. has accused both sides of South Sudan’s split of committing human rights abuses in the conflict, which has so far claimed an unknown number of lives, displaced an estimated 900,000 people both inside and outside the country and shows no signs of letting up. **An agreement to cease hostilities was violated** even **before its ink dried**, jeopardizing an already faltering mediation process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Uganda was the first of South Sudan’s neighbors to intervene militarily, sending an estimated 4,500 soldiers to the country within four days of the outbreak of fighting there on Dec. 15. Uganda was compelled, Kampala insists, by a distress call from South Sudan’s embattled President Salva Kiir and requests from the U.N., Washington and London to step in. One of the main aims of the intervention, Ugandan Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga told parliament, was to urgently prevent a potentially genocidal situation from emerging out of the political fallout between Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar. The conflict between their factions had rapidly manifested itself along an age-old ethnic fault line between Kiir’s majority Dinka and Machar’s Nuer ethnic group. However, **Uganda’s military presence** in South Sudan **has unsettled its** other **neighbors**, not least Sudan. There is no love lost between Museveni and longtime Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who have repeatedly accused each other of supporting rebel forces hostile to their governments. Bashir’s quick visit to Juba, South Sudan’s capital, three weeks after the conflict broke out was widely interpreted as a public gesture that he was ready to cast his lot with South Sudan’s government. But Juba apparently spurned Khartoum’s suggestion to set up a joint force to protect vital oil fields in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states in the north of South Sudan, which have borne the brunt of the conflict. Instead, South Sudan preferred to give that role to the Ugandan army. Bashir is now believed to be backing Machar, his longtime ally. Analysts say **Khartoum fears Uganda’s** military **involvement will** further **damage** Sudan’s **economic ties** with South Sudan, which have been significantly reduced since the South’s independence. Uganda, together with Kenya, has been pushing a $250 million infrastructure project known as the Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, which comprises a port, an oil pipeline, a railway line and a highway, and which will depend for its success on South Sudan. Uganda needs the LAPSSET corridor to transport its newly discovered oil, as it would greatly reduce the distance the oil, which must be heated at some expense for pipeline transit, would need to travel before it reaches the coast. Ethiopia, too, has reason to object to Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan. Ugandan intelligence reports say **Khartoum is** now **routing** its **support** for Machar **through Eritrea**, **Ethiopia’s bitter rival**, to cover up its involvement. Analysts say the Ethiopian government also fears **the South Sudan conflict could exacerbate tensions in Ethiopia’s Gambella region**, which borders Sudan and has a high concentration of Nuers, potentially **resulting in a full-blown conflict**. Indeed, the undercurrents of such an outbreak are already perceptible. This explains why **Ethiopian Prime Minister** Hailemariam **Desalegn**, who is the current chair of IGAD, **asked Uganda to withdraw** from South Sudan, saying its presence risked regionalizing the conflict and pointedly declaring that “there are other interests also from other sides.” Although Uganda has expressed willingness to withdraw, even announcing a two-month withdrawal timeline, **there is little appetite to** actually **do so** in Kampala’s policymaking circles. For one thing, Uganda perceives itself as the guarantor of state stability in South Sudan, which remains in jeopardy. Renewed fighting has broken out in which Machar’s forces appear to be making gains, despite having initially been pushed out of nearly all the major centers in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states by joint efforts of the South Sudanese and Ugandan troops. Moreover, Uganda’s withdrawal is conditioned on the deployment of the African Union’s African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), an outfit that is ideally supposed to rapidly respond to crises on the continent. Unfortunately, the African Union Peace and Security Council has yet to meet to work out modalities for the deployment of ACIRC in South Sudan. A tough task awaits them in finding countries willing to contribute troops to the mission. As it is, IGAD long ago approved a force of 5,600 troops for South Sudan, but has received none to date from its eight members. Indeed, only Uganda appears willing to contribute. The same is true of the U.N., which also agreed last year to augment its presence in this beleaguered nation by 5,500 troops but has yet to implement its resolutions with more blue berets on the ground. **Uganda’s** continued **military presence** in South Sudan **is** further **polarizing** both sides of **the conflict and** directly **obstructing** the IGAD-led **mediation**, which holds the best hope for a long-term political solution. Kiir, who enjoys Uganda’s military support, has demonstrated little interest in the Addis Ababa process, while Machar has preconditioned any progress in Addis Ababa on the withdrawal of all foreign military forces as well as the release of all SPLM political figures detained since the outbreak of the conflict. Meanwhile, Kampala is testing the patience of **South Sudan’s other neighbors**, who **might soon** feel the need to **join** in **the conflict** in order **to safeguard their own interests**. To break the current deadlock, IGAD must clarify the objectives of the current mediation and, together with the AU, pressure Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, while also pushing both Kiir and Machar to engage meaningfully with the mediation process. In the absence of progress in Addis Ababa, **the risk of** a **regionalization** of the conflict **looms**, further complicating any efforts to resolve the crisis.

High risk of South Sudan war destabilizing neighboring states and causing terrorism.

**Mead 13** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

These wars continue today; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Syria, the Kurdish struggle for independence, the tensions in the Caucasus. So far, the only way of settling them for good has been to exterminate minorities or to kick hundreds of thousands or even millions of people (Germans from Poland and the Sudentenland after World War II) out to create homogeneity. One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, **in Africa** at least, **there is potential for** this kind of **conflict**. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of **South Sudan** from Sudan proper, the **wars** in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) **are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real**. But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence. Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night. **The Congo war should be a reminder** to us all **that the foundations of our world are dynamite**, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today. The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that these **wars spread**. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. **Africa, and** the **potential for upheaval** there**, is of** more **importance to American security** than many people may understand. **The line between Africa and the Middle East is** a **soft** one. The **weak states that straddle** the southern approaches of **the Sahara are ideal** petri dishes **for Al Qaeda** type groups **to** form and **attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give** groups in these countries **potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons** from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. **It destabilizes** the environment for **neighboring states** (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us. **This is why** the **Clinton, Bush and Obama** administrations (representing three very different kinds of American politics) **have all been engaged in** efforts like the **peace keeping** effort **in the Congo**. It is why, despite our budget problems at home and despite our often justifiable impatience with the complexities of dealing with international coalitions and the inadequacies of international institutions, we need to continue the slow and painstaking work that makes agreements like this one possible. The world we live in is an explosive one. There are all kinds of things that can go horribly wrong, and what happens in one corner of the world doesn’t necessarily stay there. Reducing the danger requires an active, global American foreign policy whether we like it or not. The potential for new communal and religious wars that kill millions of people and endanger American security and world peace is very real. The world seems safer than the world of the 1930s and 1940s in part because the United States and many of our friends and allies are working quietly around the world to contain outbreaks of violence, address the issues that exacerbate hatred and distrust, and in the last analysis are willing to provide the security guarantees and deterrents that prevent mass mayhem.

#### Water Wars Turn

South Sudan conflict spills over to Egypt-Ethiopian water disputes.

**Johnson 3-6** writes[[31]](#footnote-31)

Egypt's musical-chairs government faces enough challenges. So why is a construction project almost 1,800 miles from Cairo provoking fears over Egypt's national survival? **Egypt and Ethiopia are butting heads** over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a $4 billion hydroelectric project that Ethiopia is building on the headwaters of the Blue Nile, **near the border between Ethiopia and Sudan**. **Cairo** worries that the megaproject, which began construction in 2011 and is scheduled to be finished by 2017, could choke the downstream flow of the Nile River right at a time when it expects its **needs** for **fresh water** to increase. Brandishing a pair of colonial-era treaties, Egypt argues that the Nile's waters largely belong to it and that it has veto power over dams and other upstream projects. Ethiopia, for its part, sees a chance to finally take advantage of the world's longest river, and says that the 6,000 megawatts of electricity the dam will produce will be a key spur to maintaining Africa's highest economic growth rate and for growth in energy-starved neighbors. The hydroelectric plant will provide triple the amount of electricity generating capacity in all of Ethiopia today. But **the spat threatens to poison relations** between two of Africa's biggest countries. "The construction of [the dam] could propel a new era of regional cooperation, but past history suggests it will more likely result in continued sniping between Egypt and Ethiopia," David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia, told Foreign Policy. The dispute has heated up again, after a fresh effort to iron out the differences at the **negotiating** table **collapsed**. Egypt has sought to get the United Nations to intervene, and reportedly asked Ethiopia to halt construction on the dam until the two sides can work out an agreement, which Ethiopian officials rebuffed. "The upper riparian states have the right to use the Nile for their development as far as it doesn't cause any significant harm on the lower riparian countries, and that is why Ethiopia is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam," Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Dina Mufti told reporters in late February. A former Egyptian irrigation minister said March 5th that Egypt is doing too little to forestall the dam, and highlighted the risks to the country's water supply. Italy's ambassador to Egypt has reportedly offered Italian help in mediating the showdown; an Italian firm is constructing the dam. The dam has been a glimmer in Ethiopia's eye since U.S. scientists surveyed the site in the 1950s. A lack of cash and Egypt's strength forestalled any development -- but that appears to have changed in the wake of the Arab Spring and Egypt's three years of domestic political upheaval. For most of the twentieth century, Egypt and Sudan divvied up the Nile's water between them. A 1929 treaty with British African colonial possessions gave Egypt the right to more than half the river's flow; a 1959 treaty upped Egypt's share to about 66%. The rest was allocated to Sudan -- while Ethiopia, whose highlands are the fount of most of the Nile's waters, was excluded from discussions. "It is only Egypt and the Republic of Sudan that consider the 1929 and 1959 agreements as legally binding on all the Nile River riparian states," John Mbaku of the Brookings Institute Africa Growth Initiative, told FP. "The Ethiopians may have undertaken what appears to be unilateral action because of Cairo's unwillingness to join other riparian states in renegotiating" those accords, he said. Ethiopia began pushing back seriously after concluding its own water rights deal with other upstream nations, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, in 2010. The protests in Egypt, the collapse of the Mubarak regime, and Egypt's three years of domestic turmoil provided a key opening for Ethiopia. It laid the first stone on the construction project in the spring of 2011 and says the dam is now about one-third complete. "With all of the chaos in Egypt, Ethiopia caught a break. It has clearly benefited from the distractions of the government in Cairo," Shinn said. In 2012, **Sudan threw its weight behind the project, driving a wedge between** the two **downstream users** of the river and complicating Cairo's hopes to block construction. The dispute over the Blue Nile dam is hardly the only case of water-driven tensions. Chinese control over the headwaters of major rivers in Asia, and ambitious plans for hydroelectric development, has sparked concern among a dozen downstream neighboring countries. Brazil and Paraguay locked horns for years over the massive Itaipu dam. Even Western U.S. states are squabbling over water rights to the dwindling Colorado River, especially important now that the region suffers a prolonged drought. But **Egypt sees the** Ethiopian **project as an existential threat**. A government study concluded, "Water security is the gravest threat facing post-revolution Egypt." Former Egyptian president Mohammed **Morsi vowed** last summer that **Egypt would not lose "one drop**" of Nile water to the Ethiopian dam, **proclaiming, "Our blood is the alternative**." Egyptian politicians were caught on camera last June urging Morsi to back armed rebels to sabotage the dam's construction. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt's putative next president, warned Ethiopia last summer **the country might resort to military action** to stop the dam, and earlier this month he discussed the dam's threats in a visit with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Egypt's fears stem from the dam's possible impacts on the Nile as it flows downstream through Sudan and eventually to the Mediterranean. The Nile provides both water for Egyptian agriculture, and also electricity through Egypt's own Aswan dam. The big problem: **There has been no public discussion** of the downstream impacts of the Ethiopian project. An international panel of experts, including representatives from Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, presented a report last summer to the three governments, but it has not been made public. Leaks of the report suggested that Egyptian power generation could indeed suffer -- but the **lack of clarity muddies the issue even for** water **experts**, because it is unclear just how quickly Ethiopia might move to fill the dam's reservoir after construction is finished. Filling it sooner would definitely choke water flows downstream, but would enable power generation more quickly; filling it gradually would push back the potential benefits of the dam for decades. Ethiopia has spoken publicly of filling the dam's reservoir in five or six years. "There's a suggestion (in the panel report) that the electricity generation at the Aswan Dam could be affected quite significantly," Michael Hammond, a water engineer at the University of Exeter, told FP. "However, it's inherently uncertain because we don't know whether we'll have ten wet years or ten dry years during the filling process," he said. Jennifer Veilleux, a PhD candidate at Orgeon State University who has done extensive field work on the impacts of the Blue Nile dam, notes that Egyptian fretting about the dam's impact on agriculture tend to focus on poor farmers. But Egypt has used the abundant Nile waters to become a major exporter of water-thirsty crops, such as cotton, which in turn has given Egypt the highest level of economic development among all Nile Basin countries.

That escalates.

**Mariam 13** writes[[32]](#footnote-32)

A spokesman for the regime in power in Ethiopia sought to minimize the importance of the Prince’s statement by suggesting that the Saudi Ambassador in Addis Ababa had disavowed the Prince’s statement as official policy or a position endorsed by the Saudi government. The alleged disavowal of the statement of a member of the Saudi royal family and top defense official seems curiously disingenuous after the fact. But that is understandable since “an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.” The regime spokesman also insinuated in fuzzy diplomatese that such **inflammatory statements could result in war** between Arab countries and African countries **in the Nile basin**. The real possibility of **a water war between** countries of the upper Nile basin, and in particular **Ethiopia**, and **Egypt and Sudan** over the so-called Grand Renaissance Dam **is the** (white) **elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about** openly and earnestly at this stage. But in November 2010, the late dictator Meles Zenawi in an interview with Reuters seemed to defiantly relish the possibility of war with Egypt. With taunting, dismissive and contemptuous arrogance, Meles not only insulted the Egyptian people as hopelessly backward but bragged that he will swiftly vanquish any invading Egyptian army. “I am not worried that the Egyptians will suddenly invade Ethiopia. Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell the story. I don’t think the Egyptians will be any different and I think they know that…The Egyptians have yet to make up their minds as to whether they want to live in the 21st or the 19th century.” Meles also accused Egypt of trying to destabilize Ethiopia by supporting unnamed rebel groups which he promised to crush. Meles served the Egyptians an ultimatum to engage in “civil dialogue”: “If we address the issues around which the rebel groups are mobilized then we can neutralize them and therefore make it impossible for the Egyptians to fish in troubled waters because there won’t be any… Hopefully that should convince the Egyptians that, as direct conflict will not work, and as the indirect approach is not as effective as it used to be, the only sane option will be civil dialogue.” Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit denied Meles’ allegations and expressed amusement and amazement over Meles’ braggadocio. “I'm amazed ... by the language that was used. We are not seeking war and there will not be war… The charges that Egypt… is exploiting rebel groups against the ruling regime in Ethiopia are completely devoid of truth.” Gheit may have been diplomatically deescalating the war of words, but his statement belies statements by a long line of top Egyptian leaders over the decades. President Anwar Sadat in 1978 declared, “**We depend upon the Nile 100 per cent** in our life, **so if anyone, at any moment, thinks of depriving us** of our life **we shall never hesitate to go to war**.” Boutros Boutros Gahali, when he was the Egyptian Foreign State Minister (later U.N. Secretary General), confirmed the same sentiment when he asserted “**the next war** in our region **will be over** the water of **the Nile, not politics**.” “If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that.” What will **Egypt will** do if Meles’ “Grand Renaissance Dam” is in fact built? "Simple." They will **use dam busters** to smash and trash it. An email from the American private security organization Stratfor released by Wikileaks citing its source as “high-level Egyptian security/intel in regular direct contact with Mubarak and Suleiman”, “If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that. Or we can send our special forces in to block/sabotage the dam. But we aren't going for the military option now. This is just contingency planning. Look back to an operation Egypt did in the mid-late 1970s, I think 1976, when Ethiopia was trying to build a large dam. We blew up the equipment while it was traveling by sea to Ethiopia. A useful case study…” The same source further indicated that Egypt is “discussing military cooperation with Sudan” and has “a strategic pact with the Sudanese since **in any crisis** over the Nile, **Sudan gets hit first** then us.” That military cooperation includes stationing Egyptian “commandos in the Sudan for ‘worst case’ scenario on the Nile issue. Sudanese president Umar **al-Bashir** has **agreed to** allow the Egyptians to build a small airbase in Kusti to **accommodate Egyptian commandos who might be sent** to Ethiopia **to destroy water facilities** on the Blue Nile…The military option is not one that the Egyptians favor. It will be their option if everything else fails.” So far Egypt has successfully lobbied the multilateral development and other investment banks and donors to deny or cut funding for the dam and to apply political and diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia and the other upstream Nile countries. The World Bank has publicly stated it will not to fund any new projects on the Nile without Egypt’s approval. The Grand Renaissance Dam or the grand dam (de)illusion? All African dictators like to build big projects because it is part of the kleptocratic African “Big Man” syndrome. By undertaking “white elephant” projects (wasteful vanity projects), African dictators seek to attain greatness and amass great fortunes in life and immortality in death. Kwame Nkrumah built the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River, at the time dubbed the “largest single investment in the economic development plans of Ghana”. Mobutu sought to outdo Nkrumah by building the largest dam in Africa on the Inga Dams in western Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) on the largest waterfalls in the world (Inga Falls). In the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny built the largest church in the world, The Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro, at a cost of USD$300 million. It stands empty today. Self-appointed Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic built a 500-room Hotel Intercontinental at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars while millions of his people starved. Moamar Gadhafi launched the Great Man-Made River in Libya, dubbed the world’s largest irrigation project, and proclaimed it the “Eighth Wonder of the World.” Gamal Abdel Nasser built the Aswan High Dam which could be affected significantly if upstream Nile countries build new dams. Ugandan dictator Yuweri Museveni built the Bujagali dam which was completed in 2012. The backflow from that dam has submerged a huge area of cultivable and settled land forcing migration and resettlement of large numbers of people. Meles Zenawi hoped to build the “Grand Renaissance Dam” as the mother of all dams on the African continent to outdo Nkrumah, Mobutu and Gadhafi. Like all of the African white elephants, this Dam is a vanity make-believe project partly intended to glorify Meles and magnify his international prestige while diverting attention from the endemic corruption that has consumed his regime as recently documented in a 448-page World Bank report. Meles sought to cover his bloody hands and clothe his naked dictatorships with megaprojects and veneers of progress and development. The “Grand Renaissance Dam” is the temporary name for the “Grand Meles Memorial Dam”. Meles wanted to be immortalized in that largest cement monument in the history of the African continent. To be sure, he had a “dry run” on immortality when he commissioned the construction of Gilgel Gibe III Dam on the Omo River in southern Ethiopia which has been dubbed the “largest hydroelectric plant in Africa with a power output of about 1870 Megawatt.” The Dam and the damned There is little doubt that IF the “Grand Renaissance Dam” is completed, it will have a significant long term impact on water supply and availability to the Sudan and Egypt. The general view among the experts is that if **the dam** is constructed as specified by the regime in Ethiopia, it **could result in significant reduction in** cultivable **ag**ricultural lands **and water** shortages **throughout E**gypt. According to Mohamed Nasr El Din Allam, the former Egyptian minster of water and irrigation, if the dam is built “**Millions** of people **would go hungry**. There would be water shortages everywhere. It's huge.” The regime in Ethiopia claims the depth of the Dam will be 150 meters and the water reservoir behind the Dam could be used to irrigate more than 500,000 hectares of new agricultural lands. Experts suggest that the water reservoir behind the dam could hold as much as 62bn cubic meters of water; and depending upon seasonal rainfall and the rate at which the reservoir is filled, there could be significant reductions in the flow of water to Egypt and Sudan. The environmental impact of the Dam in Ethiopia will be catastrophic. Experts believe such a dam if built will “flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, and create a reservoir that is nearly twice as large as Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest natural lake….” The so-called tripartite committee of international experts is expected to issue its report on the potential environmental impacts of the Dam in May 2013. The legal dimensions of the Nile water dispute The are many knotty legal issues surrounding the treaties and agreements concluded between Britain as a colonial power and the countries in the Nile basin (Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, and Egypt) on the use of Nile water. Beginning in 1891, Britain concluded at least seven agreements on the use and control of the Nile. In the major treaties, the British included language which effectively prevented Ethiopia and other upstream countries from “construct[ing] any irrigation or other works which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile” or its “tributaries.” For instance, the May 15, 1902 Treaty regarding the Frontiers between the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and British Eritrea, restrained “His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II, King of kings of Ethiopia” from “construct[ing] or allow[ing] to be constructed, any works across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana or the Sobat,… except in agreement with his Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan”. The current legal and political controversy over the Nile water revolves around the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement (which guarantees disproportionately high volumes of Nile water (85 percent) to Egypt and gave Egypt the right to monitor the Nile flow in the upstream countries and veto powers on all Nile projects upstream) and the 1959 agreement between Britain and Egypt in regards to the use of waters of the River Nile for irrigation purposes which recognized “Egypt’s natural and historic rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension…” A number of the upper-riparian states including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Burundi have rejected the validity of the 1929 Treaty and believe that they have the right to do whatever they choose with the water that flows through their boundaries (“Harmon Doctrine”). In 1964, the Government of Tanganyika openly disavowed the 1929 agreement (“Nyerere Doctrine” which asserts that a newly independent state has the right to “opt in” or selectively succeed to colonial treaties): “The Government of Tanganyika has come to the conclusion that the provisions of the 1929 Agreement purporting to apply to the countries ‘under British Administration’ are not binding on Tanganyika.” On similar grounds, Uganda and Kenya subsequently rejected that agreement. Even Sudan has challenged the allocation ratio of the water it got under that agreement. Ethiopia’s legal position on the various colonial treaties is explored in full in Gebre Tasadik Degefu’s authoritative work, The Nile: Historical, Legal and Developmental Perspectives (2003). Gebre Tasadik challenges the validity of the treaties on the grounds that “while Ethiopia’s natural rights in a certain share of the waters in its own territory are undeniable…, no treaty has ever mentioned them. This fact would be sufficient for invalidating the binding force of those agreements, which have no counterpart in favor of Ethiopia.” He also points out significant technical issues in the treaties. He suggests that the “English version of the 1902 agreement obliged Ethiopia to seek prior accord with the united kingdom before initiating any works that might affect the discharge of the Blue Nile… The Amharic version does not oblige Ethiopia to request permission from the British Government…” Others have argued that Ethiopia is not bound by the 1902 treaty with Britain because the “treaty never came into force as Britain did not ratify it and the Ethiopian government had rejected it in the 1950s”. Even if that treaty were valid, Britain is said to have violated its terms by “supporting and recognizing the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in violation of Article 60 of the 1902 agreement”. Technical interpretation of the relevant clauses of the 1902 treaty are also said to favor Ethiopia since that treaty “does not prohibit use of the Nile” but obliges Ethiopia “not to arrest of the Nile, which is interpreted to mean total blockage.” **The 1959** Nile Waters **Agreement** between Egypt and Sudan sought to give the two countries full control and utilization of Nile water by modifying certain aspects of the 1929 agreement. But that agreement **completely ignored** the interests of any of the upstream countries, particularly **Ethiopia**. **Egypt** has **refused to renegotiate** the 84-year-old treaty and insist on the perpetual binding authority of the colonial era treaties as legal formalizations of Egypt’s historical and natural rights over the Nile water. They also insist that the international law of state succession makes the treaties made by colonial Britain binding on successor post-independence African states. The general consensus among informed commentators is that the Nile treaties are not binding in perpetuity. They point to the inequitable elements of the various agreements on upper riparian states and the radical change in the scope of obligations under the agreements over the past eight decades to challenge the validity of the colonial era treaties. The paramount question is not whether the Nile water dispute can be resolved in an international court of law or other tribunal but what political accommodations can be made by the basin states to equitably benefit their nations and strengthen their bonds of friendship. Equitable sharing of **Nile water is necessary** not only **for regional stability** and amity but also to meet the growing energy and food production needs of the populations of all Nile basin countries in the coming decades. There is no shortage of predictions of doom and gloom over the looming water scarcity worldwide. Over a decade ago, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned, “Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.” Insisting on the eternal validity and binding nature of the Nile water treaties is untenable and unreasonable. The Nile Basin Initiative was established in 1999 to develop a scheme for the equitable distribution of water among the Nile basin countries. Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya have signed the Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (Entebbe Agreement). This agreement allows construction of projects that do not “significantly” affect the Nile water flow. Egypt has rejected the Agreement because it necessitates renegotiation of its share of the Nile water and surrender of its veto power guaranteed under the old agreements. Water, water everywhere… and Meles’ "damplomacy" of brinksmanship Whether there will be an actual “Grand Renaissance Dam” is the $5bn dollar question of the century. Because Egypt has been successful in pressuring multilateral development and investment banks not to fund the project, the regime in Ethiopia has defiantly forged ahead to fund the project itself. But is self-funding of the mother of all African dams a realistic possibility? The regime has kept much of the details of the Dam behind smoke and mirrors. The regime claims that the dam is 14 percent complete (whatever that means) and will reach 26 percent completion by the end of 2013. When it comes online in 2015 as scheduled, the regime claims the dam will have the power generating capacity of nearly 6,000MW, much of it to be exported to the Sudan, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. But the whole “Grand Renaissance Dam” project is being staged in the theatre of the absurd. Is it possible to raise USD$5bn by 2015 from the people of the second poorest country in the world, the vast majority of whom live on less than USD$1? The dam is said to cost as much as the country’s total annual budget of USD$5bn. Is the largest recipient of international aid in Africa capable of raising multiple billions of dollars from its citizens for the Dam? Can a country which “lost US$11.7 billion to illicit financial outflows between 2000 and 2009” be able to undertake construction of a USD$5bn dam (unadjusted for cost overruns) on its own? According to the World Bank, Ethiopia’s “power sector alone would require $3.3 billion per year to develop” in the next decade. Can the regime in Ethiopia be able to build the largest dam in Africa and other energy projects resorting to such “desperate measures” as “musical concerts, a lottery and an SMS campaign to raise funds”? Can a country which the IMF describes as having “foreign reserves [that] have declined to under two months of import coverage” as of June 2012 really be able to build the largest dam in African history? Can a country whose external debt in 2012 exceeded USD$12bn be able to build a $5bn dollar project? The regime has forged ahead to build the “Grand Renaissance Dam” by “selling bonds” domestically and in the Ethiopian Diaspora. The regime claims to have collected USD$500 million from bond sales and “contributions” of ordinary citizens. Business and institutions have been forced to buy bonds. The regime’s Diaspora bond sales effort has been a total failure. Most Ethiopians in the Diaspora have been unwilling to bet on imaginary and speculative future earnings from operations of the dam because of the regime’s morbid secrecy and lack of transparency. They have little confidence in the regime’s capacity to guarantee their bond investments. For instance, current underpricing in power tariffs which have ranged between “$0.04-0.08 per kilowatt-hour are low by regional standards and recover only 46 percent of the costs of the utility.” That does not bode well for long term bond holders. The regime in Ethiopia also has serious problems of cost overruns and poor project management in dam construction. For instance, the Tekeze hydroelectric dam on the Tekeze River, a Nile tributary, in northern Ethiopia was initially estimated to cost USD$224 million, but when it was completed seven years later in 2008, its cost skyrocketed to USD$360 million. How much the "Grand Renaissance Dam" will eventually cost, if built, is anybody’s guess. Regime ineptitude and mismanagement of Gilgel Gibe II on the Omo River in February 2010 resulted in a “tunnel collapse [which] closed the largest hydropower plant operating in Ethiopia, only 10 days after its inauguration.” To add insult to injury, the Meles regime has the gall to say that it intends to sell the power from the "Grand Renaissance Dam" to the Sudan, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula once construction is complete. That is not only nonsensical but downright insane! **Why would Egypt or** the **Sudan buy power from a dam that damns them** by effectively reducing their water supply for agriculture and their own production of power? Meles and his disciples have always known that they do not have the financial capacity to complete the Dam. They also know that actually completing the constructing the dam will be dangerous for their own survival as a regime should regional war break out. But Meles has always been a peerless grandmaster of intrigue, machination, duplicity, one-upmanship and diplomatic gamesmanship. With this Dam, he was merely pushing the envelope to the outer limits. His real aim was not the construction of dam but to use the specter of the construction of a gargantuan dam on the Nile to fabricate fear of an imminent regional water war. His price for continued regional stability, avoidance of conflict and maintenance of the status quo would be billions in loans, aid and other concessions from the international community and downstream countries. Meles' diplomatic strategy shrouded a clever deterrent military strategy: **If Egypt** goes for broke and **attacks** the "Grand Renaissance Dam", **Ethiopia could retaliate** by attacking the Aswan dam. Meles likely believed the threat of mutual assured destruction will prevent an actual war while maintaining extremely high levels of regional tensions. By playing a game of chicken with Egypt and the Sudan, Meles hoped to strong-arm donor and development banks and wealthy countries in the region into giving him financial, political and diplomatic support. There is no question Meles would have driven **on a collision course** with Egypt only to swerve at the last second to avoid a fatal crash had he been in power today. It is unlikely that Meles’ disciples have the intellectual candlepower (“megawattage”) or the sheer cunning and artfulness of their master to play a game of chicken with Egypt to skillfully extract concessions. For love of white elephants and war of the damned Water is a source of life. War is a source of death. The water of the Nile has given life to Ethiopians, Egyptians and the people of the Nile basin countries since time immemorial. If Meles prepared for war by building his dam, his disciples shall surely inherit war. But Meles should have reflected on the words of Ethiopia’s poet laureate Tsegaye Gebremedhin before embarking on his “Grand Renaissance Dam” project: “O Nile, you are the music that restores the rhythm of existence…/ You are the irrigator that cultivate peace…/ ...From my Ethiopia sacred mountains of the sun…”

### AIDS

Africa war exacerbates AIDS spread.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[33]](#footnote-33)

**One disease that affects Africa disproportionately is** HIV/**AIDS.** Buvé, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza and Mutangadura (2002) provide an overview of the spread and effect of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa.4 By the end of 2001 the HIV prevalence rate in adults in the region was estimated at 8.4 percent. Estimated prevalence rates for other regions were much lower, the Caribbean region has the second highest prevalence rate of 2.2 percent and all other regions have prevalence rates of less than 1 percent. The discussion of **why Africa is more severely affected than any other region** focuses on two explanations**: war and poverty.** Wars are conducive to the rapid spread of HIV. **Soldiers are facing** the risk of losing their lives and weigh up **the risk of contracting HIV by stressful situations and dangers** related to war. **Civilians are often subjected to** human rights abuses, including **sexual violence.** In Rwanda in 1995 the prevalence of HIV in pregnant women from rural areas was 24 percent which was attributed to rape during the genocide. Some **women** find themselves **in** abject **poverty** that **may** lead them to **use commercial sex to survive.** In general displacement during war weakens social cohesion and relationships which may lead to promiscuity and commercial sex. Poverty is also cited as a reason for the high prevalence rates. **Sexual behaviour patterns are more risky when people are poor.** Poverty also seems to increase the gender imbalance. Although women are more at risk of contracting HIV it seems that they cannot demand condom use from their partners. Buvé, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza and Mutangadura (2002) conclude that **populations in many part of Africa are becoming trapped in a vicious HIV-poverty cycle.** HIV/AIDS leads to high mortality rates among the young and economically productive, thus leading to further impoverishment. **Until the problem of** economic **development is tackled and socio-economic circumstances for young people change, it is difficult to persuade them to adapt their sexual behaviour** to secure their future. In addition to physical diseases war leaves people traumatised. Most of the victims of civil war are civilians and they are subjected to or witness war-related traumatic events such as shootings, killings, rape, torture and loss of family members. A random household survey of residents and internally displaced persons in Freetown in 1999 showed that almost every respondent was exposed to conflict. Fifty percent of the respondents lost someone to whom they were very close, 41 percent actually witnessed their death. Torture was witnessed by 54 percent, executions by 41 percent, amputations by 32 percent and public rape by 14 percent. The witnessing of such events can lead to serious psychological stress. The health services in post-conflict countries are poorly functioning. Medical staff are facing huge problems of physical diseases they have no or very little resources to address post-traumatic stress disorder.5 **War ruins a country’s economy, including the health sector. Devastated by the war the post-conflict government has got insufficient revenues to spend on** the **health** sector which faces enormous demand. At the same time **donors are** often **reluctant to fund improvements in the health sector before they can be certain that peace can be sustained.** Wakabi (2007) provides an overview of Burundi’s health sector post-conflict. Maternal mortality rates are at 1,000 per 100,000 live births and infant mortality at 114 per live births. These rates are among the highest in Africa. Other diseases, such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and HIV/AIDS have claimed 300,000 lives since 2003. Less than half the population have access to safe drinking water.

AIDS causes extinction.

**Lederberg 91**[[34]](#footnote-34)

Will Aids mutate further ? Already known, **a** vexing **feature of AIDS is its** antigenic **variability,** further **complicating** the task of developing **a vaccine.** So we know that **HIV is still evolving.** Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. **What are the odds of** its learning the tricks of **airborne transmission?** The short is, “**No one can be sure.**” But we could make the same attribution about any virus; alternatively the next influenza or chicken pox may mutate to an unprecedented lethality. As time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. **However,** given its other ugly attributes, **it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than** an **airborne** variant of **AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility;** the **prolif**eration **of AIDS** cases with secondary pneumonia **multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analogue to** the emergence of **pneumonic plague.**

#### Continental Spillover

AIDS spread from war spills over across Africa, even in peaceful countries.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[35]](#footnote-35)

In contrast to the discussion on the health burden of civil war **HIV** prevalence **rates are actually higher in peaceful countries.** They have an average prevalence rate of almost 7.5 percent in the population aged 15 to 49 in comparison to about 4 percent in war countries. **This** high average prevalence rate **is driven by** the extremely high prevalence rates of almost 20 percent or more in a number of **southern Africa**n countries**: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.** Interestingly, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating does not statistically differ significantly between peace and war countries in Africa. **This rating** is a composite measure and **takes values from 1(poor) to 6 (excellent).** The average value for non-African countries is 3.5 and differs statistically significantly from the African average. **This may indicate that** institutional reform is still slow in Africa and/or **war countries generate** a lot of **negative spillover effects which decrease the rating of their peaceful neighbours.**

#### Nuclear War AIDS Impact

AIDS spread in Africa goes global, risking nuclear civil wars.

**USAID 6** writes[[36]](#footnote-36)

As Atwood notes, HIV is much more than a social or developmental threat — it is a concrete threat to stability and security. Nelson Mandela, in a speech before the World Economic Forum in 1997, hinted of the potential for conflict and instability to emerge when a people realize that their government is unable to meet their needs when he noted that, “South Africans are beginning to understand the cost [of HIV/AIDS] … observing with growing dismay its impact on the efforts of our new democracy to achieve the goals of reconstruction and development.” In addition to eroding the link between people and their government, infectious epidemics have a more pernicious ability to pit people against each other within societies. As the resource base begins to shrink, competition among surviving groups for access to and control over the levers of power and influence increases. This competition often results in social and political fragmentation and ethnic, racial or socio-economic conflict. David Gordon of the United States National Intelligence Council, one of the first policy analysts to recognize the connection between health and security, noted in his ground-breaking 2000 “National Intelligence Estimate” the potential for intra-state conflict resulting from epidemic disease. Gordon noted that, “[t]he severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases … and the infiltration of these diseases into ruling political and military elites and middle classes of developing countries are likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce state resources.” **The global nature of the threat** HIV/**AIDS** represents **becomes** immediately **clear when we** pause to **remember how interconnected and mobile** we all **are.** Richard Holbrooke, the former United States ambassador to the United Nations, warned members of the Security Council in 2000 that, “if it [HIV/AIDS] is not dealt with, it will clearly wreck the economies of Africa and the subcontinent. [AIDS] will spread; **you can’t draw a wall around Africa and commit continental triage.**” Indeed, **HIV is spreading** daily — **hourly** — **reaching epidemic levels** of infection **throughout the developing world.** While currently concentrated primarily in sub- Saharan Africa, the disease is already emerging as a security threat in other countries, including some thought of as economically well-developed. Peter Piot, director of UNAIDS, has commented: “We have every reason to assume that the epidemic in Southeast Asia will soon be just as widespread as it is in Africa, and that East **Africa’s experience** — a slowdown of its economy — **will be replicated in Eastern Europe** and the developing countries of **Asia and Latin America.”** UNAIDS, the main advocate for global action on the epidemic, is tasked with preventing transmission of HIV, providing care and support, reducing the vulnerability of individuals and communities to HIV/AIDS, and alleviating the impact of the epidemic. **A recent study by** the **C**enter for **S**trategic and **I**nternational **S**tudies **identified five nations as the “Next Wave,” ripe for an explosion of HIV** infection rates **rivaling** those of **sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria and Ethiopia** (together representing over a quarter of that already ravaged continent’s population), **Russia, China and India. The last three nations**, which collectively contain close to a third of the Earth’s population, **are all nuclear-armed countries beset with** ethnic and **social strife and burdened by** economic and political **pressures that threaten to erupt into internal conflict.** The addition of HIV/**AIDS, with its demonstrated ability to disrupt society** at all levels**, will** only **increase** the **potential for regional conflict and instability.**

## Econ Impact

Empirics prove. African civil wars kill growth and cause drug trade, AIDS, and terror which magnify the economic loss.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[37]](#footnote-37)

Taking the national level first, **one** clear **cost of civil war is** a **reduction in** economic **growth**. Using a panel data estimate, one year of conflict reduces a country’s growth rate by 2.2 percent. Since, on average, each civil conflict lasts for about seven years, **the economy will be 15 percent smaller** at the end of the war than if the war had not taken place. During the post-war recovery, even though the economy on average grows at an annual rate of more than 1 percent above the norm, **it will take** roughly **ten years to return to** its **pre-war growth rates** (that is, 17 years after the conflict started). **21 years after** the start of the original war**,** the **GDP has returned to the level it would have achieved if no war had occurred. The** total economic **cost**, expressed as a present value at the start of the war (using a 5 percent discount rate), **is 105 percent of** the **GDP** at that point. The welfare of a country’s population is further reduced because of increased military spending during and after the war. It is estimated that **military spending increases** by about 1.8 percent during the war, and only falls back by 0.5 percent once the conflict has ended. Assuming that this higher level of spending lasts for only ten years after the conflict, the **additional cost** (expressed again as present value when the conflict started) **is 18 percent of GDP**. In addition, conflict has a severe effect on human health. One way of summarising this effect is to express the cost in terms of Disability Affected Life Years (DALYs): a measure of the total number of people affected and the period for which their disability lasts. An average war causes an estimated 0.5 million DALYs each year. Assuming they decline smoothly to zero in the 21st year and discounting them at 5 percent as for the direct economic costs gives a figure of 5 million DALYs as the net present value of health costs when hostilities start. If each DALY is valued at $1,000 (roughly the per capita income in many at-risk countries), the economic cost of **harm to** human **health** in a typical war **is** around **$5 billion.** *Regional Costs* What are the effects at the regional level? Regression analysis suggests that the growth rate of neighbouring countries not directly involved in the conflict is reduced by 0.9 percent during the war. If they subsequently recover at the same rate as the conflict country, the additional cost (as a present value at the start of the conflict) is 43 percent of initial GDP. **On average, each country has 2**.7 **neighbours, so the direct effect of** a typical civil war on **neighbouring countries is 115 percent of** the **initial GDP of one country**: greater than the direct effect in the conflict country itself. There is also an effect on military spending in adjoining countries: a neighbourhood arms race often ensues. In the average case considered so far, a 1 percent rise in military expenditure in the country at war would increase the average spending of bordering countries by 0.23 percent. In a typical conflict, that means military spending will increase by 0.4 percent of GDP during the war, and by 0.3 percent during the post-conflict period: a total net present value of 4.3 percent of the country’s initial GDP. On average, there are 2.7 neighbouring countries; thus the total extra cost of the regional arms race is about 12 percent of one country’s GDP. Other costs which are too difficult to quantify are incurred both in the country at war and in the region as a whole, including forced migration and increased disease. With the proviso that the figures so far are therefore underestimated to some degree, the total benefit of averting a single “typical” civil war can be calculated. The various national and regional costs covered so far amount to 250 percent of initial GDP. The average GDP of conflict-affected low-income countries just prior to war is $19.7 billion. **Therefore, the cost of a single war is** around $49 billion. To this we must add $5 billion of health costs, giving a total cost of **$54 billion for a** single **low-income country**. *Legacy Effect* This is already a significant figure, but in addition there is the “conflict trap”: countries that have just experienced a civil war are more likely to have further conflict. Looking at the 21 countries in which wars started and ended in the period 1965-99, the risk of conflict over the five years before the war averaged 22.3 percent, but this rose to 38.6 percent post-war. Over the 15 year period needed for the risk to reach the pre-war level again, the additional discounted cost are estimated at $10.2 billion. Thus the total national and regional cost of a single war is more than $64 billion. **There are** additional, **global impacts of civil wars**, massive in scale but difficult to assign a cost to. For example three world scourges over the last 30 years have had civil conflicts as contributory factors**:** hard **drug production, AIDS and** international **terror**ism**. Thus,** since **the** global **cost** are not included in the $64 billion it **should be treated as a conservative estimate.** This cost calculation of about $64bn is based on global data. Is this estimate relevant for Africa? Africa’s economies are smaller and the average GDP figure is lower, hence the **loss of GDP would be lower if only African countries were** to be **considered. On the other hand African wars are longer and cause**d **more loss of life,** thus **increasing the cost** of war. **African countries also have** on average **more neighbours** and thus an Africa specific estimate of the regional effects of war would be higher.

Economic crisis causes nuclear war. **Royal 10** writes[[38]](#footnote-38)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances **Modelski and Thompson**’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, **find**ing **that** rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous **shocks** such as economic crises could **usher in a redistribution of** relative **power** (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing** the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as **a rising power may** seek to **challenge a declining power** (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if** the **expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for **conflict increases**, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic **decline has also been linked with** an increase in the likelihood of **terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting **governments have** increased **incentive**s **to fabricate** external military **conflict**s **to create a “rally around the flag” effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the fact the democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. De DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States and thus weak Presidential popularity are statically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

# Frontlines

## AT Democracy Solves

Democracy doesn’t solve.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[39]](#footnote-39)

**Does democracy stabilize peace?** Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) examine whether elections reduce the risk of recurrent conflict. **Elections** seem to **reduce the risk in the year of the election, but increases it in the year following the** election. Presumably, **in the election year antagonists divert** their **efforts** from violence **to political contest, where**as **once the election is concluded the losers have a stronger incentive to return to violence.** The overall effect of elections on the duration of peace is insignificant. Therefore, post-conflict elections should be promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the post-conflict peace.

## AT Accountability

PMCs will be accountable. Resource concessions incentivize PMCs to do their job well so they get future contracts. That’s Akcinaroglu and Radziewski 12.

Incentives for accountability are strong.

**Sibanda 9** writes[[40]](#footnote-40)

The nature of the client is a key difference between the operations of the PMCs and the activities of illegitimate actors. **PMCs are bound by** a mixture of **laws, industry ethics and accountability to** owners or **shareholders. As a result, they only contract with legitimate governments**. Even then, **companies will** tend to **turn down contracts that do not fit their corporate ethos, and may impact** on their **long-term reputation or ability to win future contracts**. Others will not conduct services that are of questionable or unclear legality. Generally, **incentives ensuring appropriate behaviour are very strong.**

## AT Resource Wars (General)

No resource wars. Best empirics prove, and experts agree.

**Pinker 11** writes[[41]](#footnote-41)

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The **political scientists who track war** and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, **are skeptical of** the popular idea that people fight **wars over** scarce **resources.** Hunger and **resource shortages are** tragically **common in sub-Saharan countries** such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, **but wars involving them are not.** Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. **The** American **dust bowl** in the 1930s, to take another example, **caused** plenty of deprivation but **no** civil **war.** And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. **Pressures** on access to land and water can certainly **cause local skirmishes, but** a genuine **war** requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that **depends more on** the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and **militant ideologies** than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) **Reviewing analyses that examined a large number** (N) **of countries rather than cherry-picking** one or two, he concluded, “**Those who foresee doom, because of** the relationship between **resource scarcity** and violent internal conflict, **have very little support** from the large-N literature.”

PMCs solve civil wars where resources are at stake.

**Sibanda 9** writes[[42]](#footnote-42)

The notable role of the PMC Executive Outcomes (**EO**) in the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone **demonstrates** the **potential superiority of PMCs** to providing security guarantees in African conflicts when compared to traditional UN military forces. This is because of the comparatively robust structure and interest based capabilities of PMC forces (Fitzsimmons, 2005:1). Their involvement in African conflicts has shown that they are better suited to provide strong security guarantees in peace operations. Angola Angola held its first democratic elections on the 29th and 30th of September, 1992. Immediately after the elections however, there were tensions in the country after the close of polls, when government media began to broadcast results, not released by the National Electoral Commission, reflecting victories for the Movimento Popular de’Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and President Dos Santos in many constituencies (Cleary, 1999:153). A number of opposition parties protested to the National Electoral Commission, citing irregularities and varying degrees of inaccuracy and inconsistencies. Opposition parties called for the UN to investigate the claims and after the investigations, when UN representative, Margaret Anstee declared victory for the MPLA, however and a plurality for Dos Santos – requiring a second presidential ballot in elections that, despite irregularities, were said to be generally free and fair – tensions rose (Cleary, 1999:153). There were clashes between different political party supporters. In an effort to avert a crisis, negotiations were arranged in Luanda in the last week of October between teams representing the government and Uniciao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) (Cleary, 1999:153). However, between October 31 and November 2, while the negotiations to resolve the crisis were still under way, the riot police and units attacked and destroyed UNITA’s residences and party offices in Luanda, leading to the death of many and the capture of almost all its military and civilian cadres in the capital (Joras and Schuster, 2008:44). UNITA’s troops had by now occupied more municipal areas as well as the strategically important towns of Uige and Negage (Cleary, 1999:153). By January, the UN estimated that UNITA controlled 105 of the country’s 164 municipalities. By February 3, the Christian Science Monitor was quoting diplomats in Luanda who said that UNITA controlled between 60 and 70 per cent of the country (Joras and Schuster, 2008:47). Government forces began to drive out UNITA’s supporters from Angola’s main cities. A civil war was now officially on with UNITA being condemned for violating Angola’s peace accords. The UN did not commit its troops to assisting in the war. Soon, Savimbi’s UNITA controlled 80 per cent of Angola’s country side, and the MPLA desperately sought help, which it could not obtain from Cuba and the Soviet Union (Howe, 1998:311). **As UNITA continued with the offensive throughout** much **of Angola, Heritage Oil** and Gas **introduced EO** to the increasingly desperate MPLA government. Escalating fighting prompted the MPLA in Angola to contract with EO to fight against UNITA for which some EO personnel had previously fought (Howe, 1998:311). **EO acted as a force multiplier**, a small group whose specialized skills enhanced the effectiveness of a much larger force (Howe, 1998:312). It fielded a maximum of about 550 soldiers and trained about 5 000 government troops and 30 pilots (Joras and Schuster, 2008:48). The purpose of EO’s engagement was to recover the territory captured by UNITA between January and August 1993 and to shift the balance of military power in the Angolan government’s favour (Cleary, 1999:159). EO’s major turning point occurred in June 1994 when the EO trained 16th brigade triumphed over a strong UNITA force at N’dalatando, a strategic town outside Luanda (Howe, 1998:312). **EO** also **helped recapture** the **diamond areas** of Cafundo in mid July 1994 **and** the **oil installations** at Soyo by November (Cleary, 1999:160). **EO**’s intervention greatly **strengthened the government’s forces and** ultimately **forced** Savimbi to the **negotiating** table. The approximately 500 men initially deployed by EO in Angola had a significant effect on the overall operational efficiency of government forces. The series of military defeats suffered by UNITA as a result of EO’s direct military assistance forced the rebel movement to the negotiating table (Francis, 1999:329). In effect, EO’s immediate strategic impact created the conditions for negotiations and a peace settlement, something which the UN and OAU had not been able to achieve throughout the conflict (Francis, 1999:329). Sierra Leone The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1992, championed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of Foday Sankoh (Hirsh, 2000:33). The RUF launched its first campaign into eastern Sierra Leone on the 23rd of March 1991 at two points across the Liberian border (Richards, 2005:122). The conflict was waged by terror. Village chiefs were sent letters predicting when their settlements would be attacked (Richards, 2005:122). Thousands of people died and more than two million people were displaced by the conflict. Houses were burnt, community leaders tortured and killed. Neighboring countries became hosts to huge numbers of refugees attempting to escape the war. A divided and inexperienced Sierra Leone national army failed to stop or deal with the rebels (Richards, 1996:1). According to Richards (1996), the RUF’s signature terror tactic was physical mutilation. An estimated 20 000 civilians suffered amputation with machetes and axes being used to sever arms, legs, lips and ears. Levels of atrocity were high. The poorly equipped and poorly trained Sierra Leone army was pushed back and the RUF gained control of the diamond mines in the Kono district (Hirsh, 2000). The RUF, aided by a general breakdown in order and disloyal government soldiers, had advanced by May 1995 to about 20 miles from Freetown (Howe, 1998:313). The Republic of **Sierra Leone Military Forces evinced many** of the **limitations which have encouraged the growth of private militaries** (Howe, 1998:313). It hardly qualified as an army, despite its size of about 14 000 poorly trained and hastily recruited soldiers who lacked basic military professionalism and sometimes fought against each other (Howe, 1998:313). The RUF’s political and economic paralysis of Sierra Leone reached crisis point when it occupied the diamond mines of Sierra Rutile and Sieromco in January 1995, nearly ending the government’s ability to repay IMF loans (Montague, 2002:233). One month into the RUF’s occupation of Sierra Rutile and Sieromco, the government was pressured into seeking out an alternative military arrangement (Montague, 2002:233). **EO was formally introduced to** the **Sierra Leone** government **by** Tony Buckingham, the CEO of **Heritage Oil** and Gas (Howe, 1998:313). Subsequently, in May 1995, Sierra Leone contracted EO to help its faltering four year campaign against the RUF as well as to drive RUF out of the diamond mining areas (Howe, 1998:313). EO’s military progress was rapid. Once again, EO as a force multiplier provided technical services, combat forces and limited training. EO entered Sierra Leone with a small battalion of soldiers. Their use of helicopter gunships, pre-assault mortar barrages, and ground assaults proved to be effective against the RUF. **Within a month** of Sierra Leone’s hiring of EO in May 1995, **the government had regained control of the diamond-rich Kono district.** EO pushed RUF away from Freetown and re-opened roads to Freetown for food and fuel transport. By late January 1996, EO-backed forces had retaken the southern coastal rutile and bauxite mines, notably those belonging to Sierra Rutile and Sieromco (Pech, 1999:94). EO trained groups of inept soldiers to become far more capable fighters (Pech, 1999:94). **EO’s involvement** in Sierra Leone **facilitated a cease fire** just like what had happened in Angola. The intervention by EO brought about a succession of military reverses for the RUF. **There was a clear link between EO’s military operations and RUF’s willingness to negotiate** (Francis, 1999:329). Military successes against the RUF made elections possible and most of the people who had been displaced by fighting were able to return to their homes (Francis, 1999:329). A handful of men had repelled thousands of RUF soldiers and left the country relatively peaceful.

### AT African Resource Wars

Focusing on symptoms is the reason the West has failed to provide security in Africa, claiming to solve the root cause does nothing for security of Africans now, PMCs are still key – that’s Sibanda 9.

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